Here’s the talk I just had with Grok:

Me: In the US, like in most countries, courts consider the legality of the evidence submitted, and if such evidence was warrantless or against the law, it’s inadmissible. Similarly, I expect a court not to accept an illegal arrest of the defendant.

Today, January 3, 2026, the US has attacked Venezuela and kidnapped its president, Nicolás Maduro. Regardless of how little legitimacy this individual has as president, this action was against international law and the UN Charter.

Now, GA Pamela Bondi tweeted that “Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, have been indicted in the Southern District of New York. Nicolas Maduro has been charged with Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy, Cocaine Importation Conspiracy, Possession of Machineguns and Destructive Devices, and Conspiracy to Possess Machineguns and Destructive Devices against the United States.” https://x.com/AGPamBondi/status/2007428087143686611

Shouldn’t that court refuse to consider a case in which the defendant has been kidnapped from a foreign country whose president he was? This was not a legitimate arrest.

Grok: In the United States, the legality of how a defendant is brought before a court—such as through an allegedly unlawful arrest or abduction—generally does not prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction over the case or proceeding to trial. This principle stems from longstanding Supreme Court precedents known collectively as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.

The doctrine originates from two key cases: Ker v. Illinois (1886), where the Court held that a defendant kidnapped from Peru and brought to Illinois could still be tried, as nothing in the Constitution requires courts to inquire into the means by which jurisdiction over the person is obtained; and Frisbie v. Collins (1952), which reaffirmed that “due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards.” In essence, the focus is on the fairness of the trial itself, not the pre-trial acquisition of the defendant. The exclusionary rule, which bars illegally obtained evidence, does not extend to barring the defendant themselves from being tried.

This applies even to international abductions. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1992), the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that U.S. jurisdiction was valid over a Mexican national forcibly abducted from Mexico by DEA-hired agents and brought to the U.S. for trial on charges related to the murder of a DEA agent. The Court reasoned that the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty did not explicitly prohibit such abductions or make extradition the exclusive method for securing a defendant’s presence. Absent a specific treaty provision or protest from the foreign government that triggers a violation, the abduction alone does not divest the court of jurisdiction. (The case was later dismissed on other grounds, but the jurisdictional holding stands.)

Applying this to Maduro’s situation: The U.S. has an extradition treaty with Venezuela dating to 1922 (ratified in 1923), which lists extraditable offenses but, like the U.S.-Mexico treaty, does not expressly bar alternative means of rendition or state that extradition is the sole mechanism. Maduro’s 2020 indictment in the Southern District of New York (unsealed in March 2020 and referenced in the tweet) includes charges of narco-terrorism conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 960a and 963, cocaine importation conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 959, 960, and 963, possession of machine guns and destructive devices under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and conspiracy to possess them under 18 U.S.C. § 924(o)—all of which could qualify as extraditable under the treaty’s provisions for crimes like murder, arson, and other serious felonies. However, even if the alleged “kidnapping” violated international law (e.g., UN Charter principles on sovereignty), U.S. courts prioritize domestic precedents over general international norms in determining personal jurisdiction. Violations of international law might lead to diplomatic repercussions or claims before bodies like the International Court of Justice, but they do not automatically render the case inadmissible in a U.S. court.

There are narrow exceptions where courts might decline jurisdiction:

  • Outrageous government conduct: In rare cases, like United States v. Toscanino (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit (which includes the Southern District of New York) suggested that if the abduction involved extreme torture or shocks the conscience, it could violate due process and lead to divestiture of jurisdiction. However, this has been applied sparingly, and subsequent cases (including Alvarez-Machain) have cabined it—mere forcible abduction without egregious abuse typically doesn’t qualify.
  • Formal protest under a treaty: If Venezuela lodged a specific objection claiming the action breached the 1922 treaty, a court might review it, but historical practice shows this rarely succeeds unless the treaty language is explicit.
  • Head of state immunity: Sitting heads of state enjoy immunity from foreign courts under customary international law, but the U.S. has not recognized Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president since January 2019 (instead recognizing interim figures or the opposition-led National Assembly until recent shifts). His indictment was issued on that basis, treating him as a private citizen for legal purposes. If a court found immunity applicable, it could dismiss, but given the U.S. stance and the charges’ focus on pre- and non-official conduct, this is unlikely.

In summary, based on controlling U.S. law, the Southern District of New York would not be required to refuse the case solely due to the manner of Maduro’s capture. The trial could proceed, with any challenges to jurisdiction addressed through motions (e.g., under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12), but precedents strongly favor upholding it. This doesn’t mean the action is without controversy—critics argue it undermines international relations—but legally, the court has the authority to hear the case.

Me: So, if the police obtain evidence from a warrantless search that’s considered against the law, that evidence is inadmissible in court. But if the police illegally arrest someone in a foreign country and bring that person to a US court, the court has nothing against it? How is this normal? I believe it wouldn’t be accepted in any other civilized country!

Grok: The distinction you’re highlighting—between excluding illegally obtained evidence and allowing trials despite an irregular or illegal arrest/abduction—stems from different legal principles in criminal procedure.

Courts apply the exclusionary rule (primarily in the U.S., but with analogs elsewhere) to suppress evidence from unlawful searches because it deters police misconduct and prevents the government from profiting from its own illegality. The rule targets the reliability and fairness of the evidence itself.

In contrast, the rule for the defendant’s presence in court (personal jurisdiction) focuses on whether the court can fairly try the case once the person is before it. Most jurisdictions separate the manner of arrest from the trial’s validity, reasoning that any wrong in bringing the defendant to court is a separate issue (often diplomatic or against the abducting agents), not a reason to let a potentially guilty person go free.

This principle, known as “male captus, bene detentus” (“wrongly captured, properly detained”), is widely accepted in international and national law. It holds that an irregular arrest or abduction does not automatically bar prosecution, provided the trial itself is fair.

U.S. Practice

The U.S. follows the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, upheld in cases like United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1992), where the Supreme Court allowed trial of a Mexican national abducted by U.S. agents. Narrow exceptions exist for extreme cases (e.g., torture that “shocks the conscience”), but simple forcible abduction rarely qualifies.

Practice in Other Countries

Your belief that no other “civilized” country accepts this is understandable but not accurate—many do, especially in common law systems and for serious crimes:

  • United Kingdom — Historically followed a similar rule (e.g., Ex parte Scott (1829)). The leading case R v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Bennett (1994) allows courts to stay proceedings for abuse of process if the abduction involved executive collusion and shocks the conscience, but this is discretionary and rare; many cases proceed.
  • Canada — Generally upholds jurisdiction despite irregular rendition, focusing on trial fairness.
  • Germany — Applies male captus, bene detentus unless the violated state formally protests and the abduction involved serious rights violations.
  • France — Similar approach; courts prioritize prosecution over procedural irregularities in arrest.
  • Israel — In the famous Eichmann case (1961-1962), courts rejected the abduction defense (from Argentina), citing U.S. and UK precedents, and proceeded to trial.
  • Other examples — South Africa (State v. Ebrahim, 1991) is an outlier that stayed proceedings due to abduction violating sovereignty, but this is exceptional. Many civil law countries (e.g., in Europe) proceed unless egregious abuse occurs.

International law views abduction as a sovereignty violation (potentially triggering diplomatic protests or ICJ claims), but it does not require dismissing the prosecution. State practice largely supports male captus, bene detentus, especially for grave crimes like terrorism or war crimes.

Critics argue this encourages lawlessness and undermines extradition treaties, and some human rights bodies push for stricter limits. However, the prevailing view in most jurisdictions—including many European and Commonwealth countries—is that the focus should be on a fair trial, not release due to how the defendant arrived.

In short, while the evidence rule protects against tainted proof, the jurisdiction rule prioritizes accountability for the crime itself. This isn’t unique to the U.S.; it’s a common (though debated) feature of criminal justice systems worldwide.

Me: Find me the exact legal texts that confirm your statement about “male captus, bene detentus” being accepted in Germany, France, Italy.

Grok:

Germany

The principle of male captus, bene detentus is recognized in German jurisprudence, particularly through decisions of the Regional Court (Landgericht) and the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, or BVerfG). It is applied conditionally, often upheld unless there is a formal protest from the violated state or severe human rights violations. Below are key legal texts and decisions with exact excerpts.

Regional Court of Wiesbaden (Landgericht Wiesbaden) Decision (2020, exact date not specified in source; referenced in analysis of a case involving a defendant transferred from Iraq/Kurdistan)

This court explicitly confirmed the doctrine, stating it applies absent an extradition treaty or protest from the affected state. The reasoning emphasizes that violations of territorial sovereignty do not inherently bar prosecution under customary international law.

“But even if the transfer of the defendant was contrary to public international law, this would not necessarily entail an impediment to criminal proceedings because neither the Iraqi government nor the autonomous region of Kurdistan protested or requested his return.
Since there is no extradition treaty or any other relevant international treaty between Iraq or the autonomous region of Kurdistan and the Federal Republic of Germany, an obstacle to prosecution could only arise from customary international law.
However, from a public international law perspective, a violation of a foreign State’s territorial jurisdiction does not affect the penal power of the prosecuting State per se. In this case the principle male captus, bene detentus applies. There is no general rule of international law which would bar criminal proceedings against a person who has been brought into the forum State in violation of a foreign State’s territorial sovereignty. On the contrary, State practice shows that courts generally refuse to conduct criminal proceedings against a person abducted in violation of public international law only when the State injured by the abduction protests against the wrongful treatment and demands the return of the abducted person.”

The court cited three BVerfG decisions (detailed below) affirming no general international rule bars jurisdiction over irregularly obtained persons.

Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) Order of 5 November 2003 (BVerfGE 109, 38, 55)

This order addresses recent state practice (post-Alvarez-Machain) and rejects the principle in cases of serious human rights violations combined with a protest from the violated state.

“[R]ecent state practice, particularly following the US Supreme Court decision in Alvarez-Machain, indicates that the principle male captus, bene detentus is rejected at any rate if the state of the forum got hold of the prosecuted person by committing serious human rights violations and if the state whose territorial sovereignty was violated protested.”

Additional BVerfG Cases

  • 1985 Decision (in context of Stocké case): No general international rule bars prosecution after irregular capture.

“Eine solche Regel bestünde als allgemeine Regel nur, wenn eine entsprechende Staatenpraxis… geübt würde, daß die Freiheit der Staaten… von Völkerrechts wegen in der genannten Weise eingeschränkt ist.” (“Such a rule would exist as a general rule only if corresponding state practice… were exercised such that the freedom of states… is restricted under international law in the aforementioned manner.”)
“Gerichte es nur dann allgemein ablehnen… wenn der durch die Entführung verletzte Staat gegen die Unrechtshandlung protestiert und die Rückgabe… gefordert hat.” (“Courts generally refuse… only when the state injured by the abduction protests against the wrongful act and demands the return…”)

  • 1986 Decision (Abduction from Netherlands): Weighs the criminal wrong of abduction against the suspect’s guilt; no refusal absent protest.

“Der (…) strafrechtliche Unrechtsgehalt der „Entführung“ wiegt weniger schwer gegenüber der Schuld des Bf.” (“The (…) criminal wrongfulness of the ‘abduction’ weighs less heavily compared to the guilt of the complainant.”)

  • 2003 Decision (Al-Moayad Case): Rejects a general bar for luring/abduction; serious crimes (e.g., terrorism) justify proceedings if no protest or severe violations.

“[I]t cannot be ascertained that a practice under international law has evolved… that would make the extradition appear to be an infringement of customary international law.”
“The majority of decisions even does not regard the circumstances… as an obstacle precluding criminal prosecution.”

These align with ECHR cases like Stocké v. Germany (ECtHR, 19 March 1991), where jurisdiction was upheld absent unlawful foreign activities, and C. v. Federal Republic of Germany (ECmHR, 2 December 1985), affirming detention lawfulness despite prior irregularities.

France

French courts, particularly the Cour de Cassation, have historically applied male captus, bene detentus, upholding jurisdiction over abducted persons unless the violation shocks the conscience or involves state abuse. However, ECtHR scrutiny has limited it in cases of disguised extradition. Key texts focus on sovereignty as a state-to-state issue, not barring individual trials.

Cour de Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud (4 June 1964; International Law Reports, Vol. 45 (1972), p. 106)

Upholds jurisdiction over a former colonel abducted from Germany; irregularities do not nullify proceedings, as international issues are for states.

“La capture à l’étranger d’un citoyen ne priverait pas les tribunaux de son pays du droit et de la compétence de le juger.” (“The capture abroad of a citizen would not deprive the courts of his country of the right and competence to judge him.”)
“The putting in issue of international responsibilities concerns only relations between State and State, without individuals being entitled to intervene.”

Rapporteur Comte’s opinion:

“The Court is here to judge a man, and for nothing but that, in accordance with the rules of French criminal law, which the protests of a foreign Government can neither change nor sway.”

Tribunal Correctionnel d’Avesnes, In re Jolis (22 July 1933; Annual Digest, Vol. 7, Case No. 77, pp. 191-192)

Arrest by French agents in Belgium violated international law, leading to nullification and release (an exception where the principle was not applied due to the violation’s severity).

“[T]he exercise by a State of any of its coercive powers in foreign territory, unless based on international convention, is prohibited by the law of nations.” (Citing scholar Rousseau)

Cour de Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Barbie (6 October 1983; International Law Reports, Vol. 78 (1988), p. 128)

Expulsion from Bolivia; jurisdiction upheld for crimes against humanity, transcending extradition rules.

“By reason of their nature, the crimes against humanity… are subject to an international criminal order to which the notions of frontiers and extradition rules… are completely foreign.”

Paris Court of Appeal/Cour de Cassation, Ramirez Sánchez (Carlos the Jackal) Case (Date not specified; referenced in ECmHR, Illich Sánchez Ramirez v. France, Application No. 28780/95, 24 June 1996)

Deportation from Sudan; circumstances do not void proceedings if truth-seeking and defense rights are intact.

“The circumstances in which someone… has been apprehended and handed over to the French legal authorities are not in themselves sufficient to render the proceedings void, provided that they have not vitiated the search for and process of establishing the truth, nor made it impossible for the defence to exercise its rights.”

ECtHR cases like Bozano v. France (18 December 1986) critique disguised extradition but affirm cooperation absent rights interference.

Italy

Italian jurisprudence on male captus, bene detentus is less extensively documented in direct national court texts, often appearing in ECHR contexts involving transfers or cooperation with other states. No standalone Italian statute explicitly codifies it, but practice suggests acceptance unless irregularities violate ECHR rights or involve abuse. Cases imply jurisdiction is retained post-irregular transfer, aligned with civil law traditions.

European Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR), Bozano v. Italy (Application No. 9991/82, Decision on Admissibility, 12 July 1984)

Alleged Italian involvement in French/Swiss handover; declared inadmissible as ill-founded, implying no bar to detention despite irregularities.

(No direct quote on the principle, but the decision upholds Italian imprisonment post-transfer: “A couple of months after these events, Switzerland extradited Bozano to Italy where he was imprisoned.”)

This reflects tacit acceptance, as no violation was found impacting jurisdiction.

Other references (e.g., Öcalan v. Turkey, ECtHR 2005) note Italy’s role in pre-abduction movements but find no interference with rights, supporting cooperation under the principle. Scholarly analyses indicate Italy follows the doctrine in transnational cases, though direct Italian court quotes are sparse in available sources, often tied to broader European practice rather than domestic rulings.

If this is justice, then I am the Pope, the Dalai Lama, and the President of China at the same time!

Why are we even bothering with international warrant arrests? The easy way would be to kidnap people in the street and exfiltrate them in a diplomatic suitcase! It did happen in the past, but it should be the rule!

Also, the US has that ridiculous “Miranda warning,” as if people wouldn’t know that they have the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney, but there is no right not to be abducted from another country!

Non-native speakers should learn how to pronounce correctly the name of their Supreme Leader: