First of all, there are no uniform tariffs a country sets for goods and services coming from another country. Countries set tariff rates per product category. There is a Harmonized System used by most countries under the World Customs Organization, and HS codes for products. So one cannot say, “Vietnam imposes a 90% tariff on goods coming from the US.” This has no real meaning unless an HS code is specified. Sometimes, there are also quota systems. There is absolutely no “blanket” tariff, nor is it possible or relevant to determine an “average” tariff.

Secondly, unless specific bilateral or multilateral agreements are in place, or rather sanctions or retaliatory tariffs apply, the tariffs set by a country for imports from the US are not US-specific, but WTO-specific, meaning that the US gets the same treatment as all other WTO members that don’t have specific agreements with the country that imports those goods. Specifically, all the countries that have the MFN (Most Favored Nation) statute in relation to the US don’t discriminate against the US, and vice versa.

Thirdly, the column “Tariffs Charged to the U.S.A. Including Currency Manipulation and Trade Barriers” is another hallucination of Trump’s. An alleged currency manipulation is difficult to quantify, and its inclusion in the tariffs is arbitrary.

Also, the so-called “Discounted Reciprocal Tariffs” (also called “Kind Reciprocal Tariffs” in Drumpf’s speech, because some of them are roughly half of the alleged tariffs imposed by a country), if they’re meant to be blanket, flat tariffs, are a complete aberration. To the point: to what exactly does the EU apply a precise 39% tariff? There is probably no such product category! To what exactly will the US apply a 20% in relation to the EU? To everything? Oh, wait, does this mean that the 25% tax on light trucks, imposed in 1964 in the Chicken War with France and Germany, and still in place, is lowered to 20%? Yay!

Unfortunately, no. It has been clarified that this is to be interpreted as follows:

  • There is a new minimum baseline 10% tariff on all countries, effective on April 5.
  • Higher tariffs will apply to many countries, effective on April 9. (That’s 20% for the EU, 34% for China.)
  • Canada and Mexico, being subject to 25% import duties, will be exempt for now from extra tariffs.
  • Steel, aluminum, and automobiles, which are already subject to specific import tariffs of 25%, will not be affected by the new reciprocal tariffs. However, further tariffs are to be expected for copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and lumber.

Donald John Trump is the supreme retard of the planet!

Note that his minions aren’t any smarter. The tables shared by the Official Rapid Response account of the Trump 47 White House and by the White House are not in alphabetical nor in any other consistent order!

Random remarks: I couldn’t find Russia in these tables. And the last but one in the list, the Heard and McDonald Islands, have an exact population of 0 (zero). Ironically, a blanket 10% tariff is probably acceptable under the WTO’s guidelines.

It has never been the case in the history of the planet to have such an incompetent mob rule a country.

OK, here’s the real deal. If we agree to ignore the most idiotic speech he ever gave, this orange retard has signed an executive order on “Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits” which mentions that “the United States has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in the world at 3.3 percent.” The important figures are in Annex I (the 57 countries with adjusted tariffs, meaning they are over 10%), and in Annex II (the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States codes for which the new tariffs apply).

Of course, this retard or whoever wrote the executive order for him rants at random. “For network switches and routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff, but for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a higher rate.” How the fuck is his problem? All routers are made in China, not in the US! “Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30 percent) impose a higher tariff on ethanol than does the United States (2.5 percent).” Who the fuck cares? “For rice in the husk, the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent (ad valorem equivalent), while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40 percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) impose higher rates.” Is the US a major exporter of “rice in the husk”?! “Apples enter the United States duty-free, but not so in Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50 percent).” The funny thing is that indeed, there is no duty for apples (0808.10.00), except if they come from Cuba, North Korea, Belarus, or Russia, in which case it’s 1.1¢/kg.

● Richard Partington, in The Guardian, Trump’s ‘idiotic’ and flawed tariff calculations stun economists: ‘Willing sycophants’ came up with simplistic formula that has thrown global economy into disarray.

The method used to calculate the most important numbers in international trade, politics and economics has left some of the world’s leading experts shocked.

For each country, the White House looked up its trade in goods deficit for 2024, then divided that by the total value of imports. Trump, to be “kind”, said he would, however, offer a discount, so halved that figure. The calculation was even distilled into a formula.

For example, take the figures for China:

  • Goods trade deficit: $291.9bn
  • Total goods imports: $438.9bn
  • Those figures divided = 0.67, or 67%
  • And halved = 34%

For countries without a large deficit, the White House applied a 10% baseline, ensuring tariffs would be applied regardless. This was the case for the UK, which the US Census Bureau reckons had an almost-$12bn surplus in 2024.

Now you know what grotesque algorithm was used for the absurd “Tariffs Charged to the U.S.A. Including Currency Manipulation and Trade Barriers” value. I’ve noticed that the “kind retaliatory tariffs” tend to be half of that value, but what was that absurd value derived from? Now we know.

US goods are too expensive for consumers in developing economies to buy – helping to explain some of the particularly large trade deficits – and new tariffs – for poorer countries.

Adam Tooze, an economic historian at Columbia University in the US, said there were “grotesque” policies for south-east Asian countries, including a 49% Cambodian tariff, and rates of 48% for Laos and 46% for Vietnam.

“This is not because they discriminate viciously against American exports, but because they are relatively poor. The US does not make a lot of goods that are relevant for them to import,” he said.

Vietnam in particular has become part of the global supply chain for major manufacturers, including US tech and clothing companies such as Nike, Intel, and Apple.

Lesotho, the tiny southern African country, one of the poorest in the world, is another odd example, facing a tariff of 50%. Among its main exports to the US are diamonds and clothes.

Yeah, so very “kind” of Trump.

● Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick is the source of Trump’s madness. To quote from an older article:

On stage at Madison Square Garden, Lutnick explained what he thinks “Make America great again” actually means – and when, in his view, the US was sufficiently great: 1900. “At the turn of the century, our economy was rocking,” he claimed. “We had no income tax, and all we had was tariffs.” As taxes rose, and tariffs fell, generation after generation of US political leaders allowed “the rest of the world [to] eat our lunch”, according to Lutnick, whose preferred course of action is clear: cut taxes and raise tariffs, as Trump has pledged.

Now you know even more.

There’s a more detailed article in Le Figaro about this retard: «On l’accuse de pousser Trump à en faire trop»: qui est Howard Lutnick, le «Monsieur Droits-de-Douane» du président ? (barrier-free).

Allow me to translate a few comments from the readers of Le Figaro:

e=mc2: In 1900, the American state was “poor”. The federal budget was so low that the USA couldn’t afford a world-class army. Back then, France could have invaded the USA… and won the war. If the simple-minded person who misses the “good old days” wants to go back 125 years, let him… but don’t be surprised if China, Russia or even Mexico are in a position to invade the USA.

Taxidermiste-de-castors: Except that in 1900, a manufactured product didn’t cross 15 borders during its production. These guys are as stupid as Marxists. Anyway, it doesn’t matter, we’ll just wait for the stock markets to collapse and buy at rock-bottom prices, and in 4 years’ time, when they’re fired, we’ll have made some superb deals.

anonyme 93574: In 1900, all is said.

Aetius 8: Trump, on his wise counselling, plans to meet soon with the Empress of China Cixi, the Emperor of Austria Franz Joseph I, the Emperor of Germany Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II. For his overseas travels, he will take a Zeppelin airship. Or a new steamship, the Titanic.

Aetius 8: Back then, there was no pension or social security, children had to work and the working day lasted 12 hours… And women didn’t have the right to vote!

Aetius 8: He wants to return to the Gilded Age of the “Robber Barons”, between 1870 and 1914, with trusts, no social protection, 60-hour weeks, no social security or pensions, no strikes, child labor, no income tax… And the gold standard!

Aetius 8: In 1900, under President Mac Kinley, American life expectancy was 45, blacks and women didn’t have the right to vote, and the U.S. annexed Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico after a war with Spain… Oh, and Mac Kinley was elected in 1897 because he was in favor of the gold standard: $20 for an ounce of gold. Today it’s $3,000 an ounce…

LPigot: And at the end of his term, MacKinley admitted that trade wars based on tariffs were bad…

● Lessons from History: Smoot-Hawley Act vs Trump Tariffs:

The global economy is on shaky ground—recovering from a pandemic, geopolitical tensions, and a fragmented supply chain. Rising inflation, war-induced energy shocks, and technological disruption are already straining global cooperation. Amid this, Trump’s tariff talks echoes a populist appeal: protect American workers, punish foreign producers, and revive domestic manufacturing.

Similarly, back in 1929, the markets were at a peak akin to the current scenario. However, the world was still reeling from World War I, struggling to rebuild while navigating a shifting geopolitical landscape. Protectionism became the knee-jerk response, with the U.S. leading the charge.

Under pressure from farmers and industrial lobbies, America raised tariffs on over 20,000 goods to “protect American jobs.” The Smoot-Hawley Act, signed into law in June 1930, initially seemed like a shield against foreign competition. Instead, it became a wrecking ball.

Retaliation was swift. Twenty-five countries, including Canada, France, and the UK, countered with their own tariffs, sending shockwaves through an already fragile global economy. The US economy which was already under a slowdown went into a prolonged recession.

U.S. unemployment, at 8.7% in 1930, skyrocketed to 23.6% by 1932. GDP shrank by nearly 30% between 1929 and 1933. Rather than safeguarding American jobs, tariffs triggered a 60% collapse in U.S. exports and a 66% drop in global trade volume (League of Nations data).

● US tariff burden could be higher than under Smoot-Hawley:

Economists have calculated that the US tariffs would hit their highest level in over a century if the measures announced by Donald Trump last night are implemented in full.

Capital Economics have calcualted that the effective tariff rate on all imports will rise from 2.3% last year to around 26%, leaving it at a 131-year high, once you add the new reciprocal tariffs to the earlier hikes on goods from China, and the product-specific tariffs on steel, aluminum and autos.

They told clients: “Stepping back, the main message from President Trump’s “Liberation Day” announcement was that US tariffs were increased by more than even we had anticipated. Since election day, we have built our forecasts on an assumed that the US would impose a tariff of 60% on imports from China and 10% on imports from all other countries. That would take the effective US tariff rate to around 17%. Instead, the system of reciprocal tariffs that was announced, together with the additional product-specific tariffs that appear imminent, will take the effective US tariff rate to just under 25%.”

That, according to this chart from Capital Economics, would take the effective tariff rate higher than under the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was brought in early in the Great Depression, as a protectionist measure to help US companies. But it is generally accepted it worsened the slump, which followed the Great Crash of 1929, by weakening global trade.

As Dr Eric Golson, Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Surrey, recently explained: “History has shown that trade wars come with long-term economic pain. The Great Depression was exacerbated by an international tariff war, with global trade plummeting by 66% between 1929 and 1933, crippling American businesses and driving unemployment to catastrophic levels.”

UBS have also calculated that the “US weighted average import tariff is back to pre-WW I levels”.

They told clients: “Combining all the tariffs, we believe the weighted average tariff for the US has increased to 24%, from just 2.5% at the start of the year, a 21.5pp increase, and equivalent to a $715bn increase in dollar terms.”

● Euronews: Here’s why President Trump’s tariffs could benefit European consumers:

…while exporters brace for a hit, the shock move from Washington might not spell economic hardship for [European] consumers.

In fact, it could lead to cheaper goods at home, at least in the short term.

At the heart of the matter lies Europe’s long-standing trade surplus with the United States.

According to the European Commission, the European Union exported €503.8 billion in goods to the United States in 2023 and imported €347.2bn — yielding a trade surplus of €156.6bn.

The picture shifts when it comes to services, with Europe importing €427.3bn and exporting €318.7bn. A large share of services imports are tied to US tech giants.

Even so, the EU still maintains a positive overall trade surplus with the US.

This backdrop matters. If the US levies a 20% blanket tariff on EU goods, the brunt of the impact falls disproportionately on European exporters.

Everything else being equal, European products just became 20% more expensive in one of their most important markets—risking a significant loss of competitiveness.

A wheel of Parmigiano Reggiano from Italy, or a bottle of French wine, for example, will suddenly carry a 20% premium for American consumers.

…

The US accounts for roughly 12% of total EU exports, meaning that replacing that demand overnight is nearly impossible.

As US demand wanes, inventories could pile up in Europe and elsewhere. That means more goods available for the domestic market—which, in turn, could lead to discounts and lower prices for European consumers.

In the short term, this could prompt firms to offload excess stock in domestic markets, fuelling price competition and potential discounts.

At the same time, the European market risks being flooded by goods redirected from other major exporting nations—such as China, Japan, and India—that are also facing steep trade barriers in the US. This added wave of global supply could further amplify availability and intensify downward pressure on prices across the continent.

In other words, a trade shock that weakens external demand might—ironically—translate into modest disinflationary pressure within Europe, at least temporarily.

Which products could see lower prices

Europe’s trade surplus with the United States is heavily concentrated in a handful of key sectors. Pharmaceuticals lead the way, accounting for a €57bn surplus, followed closely by vehicles at €44bn, based on International Trade Centre data.

The beverage industry contributes another €8bn, while ships and boats add €5.4bn. Luxury goods—including leather products, apparel, and footwear—deliver a combined surplus of €9bn. If demand from the US market weakens, these sectors risk accumulating unsold inventory.

In the short term, European consumers may benefit from cheaper prices in pharmaceuticals, vehicles, clothing, and even food and beverages.

● A personal note: I always wondered how the real economy works when tariffs increase. I’ve heard that French winemakers think that their sales to the US will drop by 20% when tariffs increase by 20%.

I don’t believe anything is so automatic. Nobody in the US says, “I always spend $200/month for wine, and I drink European wine, so I’ll drink less to match the budget.” Wine isn’t like gasoline—its demand isn’t purely utilitarian. If someone’s buying a $30 French bottle, they might be paying for taste, prestige, or habit. Economists call this “inelastic demand”—up to a point, price hikes don’t deter buyers much. Moreover, luxury buyers (think $100+ bottles) barely flinch at a 20% price increase.

Of course, given the inflationary pressure on all US prices, many people might decrease the consumption of unnecessary items, be they French wine or American wine (the beer is cheaper!), or French perfumes. But this is another story.

If an American consumer usually purchases a cheap $6 American wine, they will keep doing so. If they prefer a $100 Napa Valley one, so be it. But if they have chosen a $30 French (or Italian, Spanish, whatever) wine, they expect an imported wine to be somewhat more expensive than a local one. They decided that $30 is the correct price. Would $36 make that much of a difference? I’m not sure that it is. To me, if a €10 wine becomes €12, I’d keep buying it if it’s something I like. I wouldn’t change the wine (or the coffee) just because it’s slightly more expensive. OK, 20% is not 10%, so it’s more visible, but this shouldn’t affect such products.

Not to mention that not all of the tariff cost gets passed on. Importers or retailers might eat some of it to stay competitive, especially if they’re worried about losing market share to domestic options. So a $30 French wine might not jump to $36—it could land closer to $33 or $34.

On the other hand, everyday items are more important. If they’re really crucial, they’ll keep being purchased at the same rate, and people might stop buying other types or items altogether if the income doesn’t increase.

And the inflationary pressure also comes from “invisible” imports, such as cheap ingredients in some grocery items. Say the flour or the sugar or other ingredients, which are very cheap in processed foods (literally, you don’t know what you’re eating!), are imported from countries penalized by Trump with high tariffs. Your “American” food will get more expensive! (Same for cars: there isn’t any single US-assembled car to have all its components made in the USA!)

So when everything “domestic” but “invisibly with imported ingredients or parts” gets more expensive, everything visibly imported doesn’t look that much more expensive. If an American product is 10-15% more expensive, how would a European one not be 20% more expensive?

So it’s impossible to tell the impact of a 20% extra tariff on an imported item. Will its sales decrease by a negligible value, say by 5-10% at the most? Or rather by 30-50%? It depends on the perceived importance of the product and on its role to the customer. But 10-15% seems more plausible. Unless a severe social crisis develops, in which case only the luxury items will be largely unaffected, while the common people won’t be able to afford much, regardless of the origin.

While the entire world economy is going to be hit by Trump’s mental retardment and the announced tariffs, the American people will lose the most. Even Trump’s beloved car factories, or American computers and smartphones (Apple’s announced investments) and whatnot, would take years to materialize. Nothing can be done overnight. (And all those “$500bn investments” are BS.) The inflation, baby, this is going to be fun! Talk again about “sleepy Joe”…