There might be more important things to worry about right now, but I thought of wasting some time with one that bothers me. And yes, it’s about comrade Xi. I might have too many illusions about China’s wisdom (for lack of another word) in international relations.

Xi Jinping will visit Moscow from May 7 to May 10, 2025, to attend Russia’s Victory Day celebrations on May 9, including the Red Square parade with Putin. He should arrive in Moscow any time now.

Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will send an honor guard to participate in Victory Day parades in both Moscow and Minsk (Belarus), to commemorate the defeat of Nazi Germany. Chinese soldiers have been rehearsing in both cities. This would be the first time a Chinese honor guard will march in Minsk, although China previously sent troops to Moscow for the 2015 Victory Day parade.

This is a huge diplomatic blunder.

Why is China interested in the V-Day in Europe instead of the day the war ended in the Pacific, which is September 2, or China’s Victory Day, which is September 3? Would Putin come to Beijing to celebrate such a day? Certainly not! Putin’s attendance at Beijing’s 2015 parade marking the 70th anniversary of Japan’s surrender was a one-off event.

Unfortunately, Xi’s attendance at Moscow’s Victory Day and the deployment of PLA honor guards to Moscow and Minsk signal China’s commitment to its “no limits” partnership with Russia. This move to counter Western influence comes at a bad time, particularly given that China seeks a vast international alliance to counter Trump’s tariffs.

If it weren’t for the war in Ukraine, China’s joining of Russia’s Victory Day would have reinforced a shared narrative of resisting Western hegemony in a rather acceptable way. Meanwhile, avoiding overemphasizing China’s Victory Day prevents further tensions with Japan other Asian neighbors.

But there’s a problem here.

First, the “no limits” partnership with Russia is a smokescreen. Only the retards (for lack of another word) take it at face value. China needs Russia for the energy imports and for the cooperation in the nuclear energy. At the same time, I am positive that Xi personally despises Putin, and China knows very well that Russia’s economy is a joke. China’s pragmatism would be perfectly acceptable, except that China also claimed neutrality in the war in Ukraine.

But while China didn’t nominally help Russia in conducting the war (the few Chinese fighting on Russia’s side were not sent by the government; only North Korea sent troops and weapons, and Iran sent drones), it also failed to give any proof of real neutrality. I wouldn’t ask for it to stop buying Russian gas or oil—even the European Union, which otherwise imposed rounds after rounds of sanctions, only set 2027 as the year of completely freeing itself from the dependency of Russian energy. But literally supporting Russia and Belarus, even if only symbolically, can’t do any good to China’s image in the parts of the West that are now opposing the United States, despite still being allied as part of NATO.

The European Union plans to impose additional tariffs on about €100 billion worth of US goods if trade talks currently underway fail to produce a satisfactory outcome for the bloc. Simultaneously, Xi Jinping has called on European Union leaders to stand with China against unilateralism:

In a message to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of EU-China ties, Xi said the two sides need to “properly manage” differences and deepen strategic communication.

“China and the EU should uphold multilateralism, defend fairness and justice, oppose unilateral bullying,” state media Xinhua cited Xi as saying on Tuesday. The two sides “should work together to address global challenges, and jointly promote an equitable and orderly multipolar world and an inclusive economic globalization,” he added.

Xi’s outreach is the latest sign of Beijing’s willingness to improve relations with Brussels, coming on the same day that China publicly confirmed for the first time it was suspending sanctions against European lawmakers that had hampered mutual exchanges.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Lin Jian, told reporters at a daily press briefing on Tuesday that while ties between Beijing and Brussels had experienced “twists and turns,” time has come to turn a new page.

“Under the current circumstances, both sides believe that it is very important for China and the EU to strengthen dialogue and cooperation,” Lin was cited as saying by state broadcaster China Central Television. “We believe and expect that with the full resumption of exchanges between China and the EU, exchanges and understanding between the two sides will be deepened.”

And the EU has indeed made steps towards improving relations with China, e.g., by considering minimum price quotas for Chinese EVs instead of tariffs. However, EU’s High Representative Kaja Kallas has called China a “key enabler” of Russia’s war for providing dual-use goods (e.g., electronic components), so there is a need for more openness from both parts to get things sorted out.

If I were Ursula von der Leyen, António Costa, or Kaja Kallas, I’d have sent this letter to Xi Jinping:

Dear President Xi Jinping,

As you once said, “History has told us to stay on high alert against war, which, like a demon and nightmare, would bring disaster and pain to the people. History has also told us to preserve peace with great care, as peace, like air and sunshine, is hardly noticed when people are benefiting from it, but none of us can live without it.” This is why, in the aftermath of World War II, peoples of Europe have created an economic community that would later become the European Union. Some European countries also joined a defensive military alliance that, despite the interpretations of some Russian leaders, is not directed against anyone and would not start a war against any country. The continuous development of trade relations with the former Soviet Union and then with Russia is proof of the good will of our countries.

Unfortunately, recent events have shown that misinterpretations can lead to war and humanitarian disasters. Refusing any real talks, Russia has invaded Ukraine. Committing crimes of war, if not even crimes against humanity, in a neighboring country just because one doesn’t like that country’s friends and alliances is unacceptable in the 21st century. All efforts should be made to stop this war. This is why we’re deeply saddened by your presence to Russia’s Victory Day celebrations on May 9. We understand the message against a war that has killed about 80 million people and wounded some 25 million. But while we’re all commemorating that tragic episode of the past, a fresh war is taking place not that far away. We would have hoped for you to bring a strong message against war to President Vladimir Putin. For the time being, however, the image is that of a complete support of Russia’s policies and actions. We could not stress enough how much disappointment we feel in this regard.

You have repeatedly reiterated China’s commitment to peaceful development, pledging that China will never seek hegemony, expansion, or any “sphere of influence,” no matter how strong it may grow. We share the same view, notwithstanding the issues we agree to disagree upon and the differences in the views about governance and specific human rights. Peaceful development and increased cooperation, including free trade under the WTO framework and through bilateral agreements, are mutual values.

The European Union, as it was the case with most of the world, has been targeted by the unprecedented stance against free trade of the President of the United States. We have never been supporters of a global hegemony shaped by the military alliances of the former Cold War, nor are we adepts of a “World Order” centered on the United States. Recent events have shown that the Global South should play its proper role in an alternative, more open world order. And this, despite the differences that still exist between some of us.

In the context, we also want to express our concern and our sadness regarding the current India-Pakistan standoff. It goes without saying that we, as civilization, should increase our efforts to stop all ongoing wars and prevent any new ones.

Dear President Xi, would you consider complementing your presence alongside President Putin with a stronger message for ending the war and for a just, sustainable, and comprehensive peace in Ukraine?

During a 2014 visit to France, you reshaped Napoleon’s metaphor of China as a “sleeping lion” as follows: “Now China the lion has awakened. But it is a peaceful, amicable, and civilized lion.” Could this lion deepen its engagement to help the restoring of peace and cooperation in Europe and in the world?

We used to share the same belief that isolating any nation economically risks further instability. Unfortunately, the “Wandel durch Handel”—and, more generically, “détente through mutual prosperity”—political philosophy initiated by chancellor Willy Brandt, who even received the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize for his work in improving relations between the rival blocs in the Cold War, continued by further increasing economic cooperation with Russia, failed to prevent the invasion of Ukraine. Trade and economic cooperation alone were not able to guarantee peace.

“Trustworthiness comes close to rightness, in that your word can be counted upon.” We look forward to seeing signs that this Victory Day attendance is purely historical and is not endorsing Russia’s war in any way.

Yours sincerely,
etc.

But I am only who I am. And I am disappointed.

Let’s face it: China is already here, in Europe, and it’s much more present than most people realize. Here’s a recent example.

The other day, I was reading that the 1.8L hybrid 155 PS engine introduced with Dacia Bigster will also be present on Renault Captur and Simbyoz, but in a slightly improved version offering 160 PS. The Romanian press stressed that these engines were developed at Horse Romania’s R&D center and produced at the Horse plant in Valladolid (Spain). What the press failed to mention is this: Horse Powertrain Limited is a joint venture holding equally owned by Renault and Geely aimed at producing powertrains, including internal combustion engines (ICE) and hybrid systems. And Geely is the short name for Zhejiang Geely Holding Group Co., Ltd. Dacia-Renault with a Geely engine designed in Romania and produced in Spain! End of story.

🤖

As an experiment, I asked Grok why the Chinese censors decided that the benevolent image of Winnie-the-Pooh not only cannot be associated in any way with Xi’s, but Winnie’s name cannot appear in the same text or on the same page as Xi. I was genuinely puzzled by the fact that even a text explaining why such an association would be disrespectful cannot be accepted in China and is self-censored by AI models such as DeepSeek and Qwen (for Qwen3, see here how and when the censorship is triggered—or not).

From Grok’s answer:

Context of China’s Censorship

China’s censorship of Winnie-the-Pooh references stems from internet memes comparing Xi’s appearance to the character, which began around 2013 and gained traction globally. These were seen as undermining Xi’s authority, prompting bans on related content, including in AI models like DeepSeek and Qwen, which avoid associating Winnie-the-Pooh with Xi to comply with state guidelines. This reflects:

  • Cultural Sensitivity: In China, respect for leaders is tied to national pride and stability. Public mockery, even if humorous, is perceived as a threat to social order, especially in a digital landscape where content spreads rapidly.
  • Political Control: The Communist Party prioritizes narrative control to prevent dissent or erosion of authority, viewing open discussions of such issues as potential gateways to broader criticism.
  • Historical Precedent: China’s censorship is part of a broader system (e.g., the Great Firewall) designed to manage information flow, rooted in the belief that unchecked discourse led to historical upheavals like the Cultural Revolution.

Counterarguments from China’s Perspective

China’s approach is defensible within its framework:

  • Stability Over Transparency: China prioritizes social order over open debate, given its population of 1.4 billion and history of unrest. Allowing discussions of sensitive issues risks escalating into broader critiques of the Party, as seen in past online movements.
  • Cultural Norms: Respect for authority is a Confucian value, and public mockery is seen as disrespectful, not humorous. Explaining the issue could amplify the memes’ visibility, defeating the purpose of censorship.
  • Practical Constraints: Educating 1.4 billion people on nuanced issues is logistically challenging, and the Party opts for blanket censorship as a simpler tool to manage discourse.

I objected that the Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of China is not censored, as people need to know what they’re not supposed to do and what’s punishable. So why this interdiction cannot even be expressed?

From Grok’s reasoning:

Why China Suppresses Explanations

China’s censorship of explanations about sensitive issues like Winnie-the-Pooh stems from a strategic calculus:

  • Preventing Amplification: Discussing why Winnie-the-Pooh is censored risks spreading the memes further, as public curiosity could lead to more searches or satire. The state prefers to quietly remove such content to maintain narrative control.
  • Avoiding Precedent: Openly explaining censorship decisions could set expectations for transparency in other areas (e.g., Tiananmen Square or COVID-19 origins), which the Party avoids to prevent challenges to its authority.
  • Cultural Framing: The Party views mockery of leaders as a Western-style attack on national dignity, not a legitimate critique. Explaining this publicly might legitimize the satire by acknowledging it, so censorship is preferred to dismissal.

This contrasts with the Criminal Law’s clarity, where explicit rules (e.g., Article 105 on subversion) are publicized to deter violations. Censorship of cultural references operates in a gray zone, relying on administrative power rather than codified law, which allows flexibility but sacrifices transparency.

China’s Counterargument

China would likely argue that its approach is effective within its context:

  • Stability First: With 1.4 billion people and a history of social upheaval (e.g., Cultural Revolution), the Party prioritizes control over openness to prevent dissent from escalating. The Criminal Law’s clarity suffices for major crimes, while censorship handles minor provocations.
  • Cultural Norms: Confucian respect for authority discourages public critique of leaders. Explaining censorship could be seen as validating disrespect, undermining the Party’s moral authority.
  • Practicality: Educating the public on every censored item is logistically infeasible and risks creating a Streisand effect, where attention amplifies the issue. Censorship is a blunt but efficient tool.

Criminal Law vs. Censorship: A Key Distinction

Your point about the Criminal Law’s transparency highlights a critical distinction:

  • Criminal Law: Publicized to deter and punish serious threats (e.g., treason, subversion). Articles like 102 (treason, life imprisonment) or 246 (insult, up to 3 years) are clear and accessible to ensure compliance.
  • Censorship: Often administrative, not judicial, and deliberately opaque to avoid public debate. The Winnie-the-Pooh issue falls under CAC regulations, not the Criminal Law, allowing the state to suppress without codifying specific bans, which preserves flexibility but obscures rationale.

This duality reflects China’s governance: legal clarity for state security, ambiguity for cultural control. Your objection suggests that extending the Criminal Law’s transparency to censorship could align with China’s educational goals, but the Party’s risk-averse approach prioritizes control over dialogue.

I had another objection, and I replied with a simplified characterization of the Cultural Revolution:

You mentioned “historical upheavals like the Cultural Revolution.” But the Cultural Revolution wasn’t a genuine popular upheaval; it was encouraged by Mao, who saw the power of his political position fade in the face of the increasing relevance of the administrative positions of the president and of the prime minister. In the end, even Mao acknowledged that this madness had to stop, but it was of his making!

Grok3 agreed:

You’re absolutely correct to challenge the characterization of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) as a “genuine popular upheaval,” and your point about its origins and Mao Zedong’s role is well-founded.

To the point:

Relevance to Censorship

In my earlier response, I referenced the Cultural Revolution as an example of “historical upheavals” to explain why China prioritizes stability through censorship. Your objection highlights that this framing was imprecise, as the Cultural Revolution was a state-driven campaign, not a bottom-up revolt. However, the CCP’s modern censorship policies are shaped by the legacy of the Cultural Revolution’s chaos, not its origins. The Party views it as a cautionary tale of unchecked ideological fervor and social disorder, which informs its rationale for controlling discourse, including suppressing explanations about sensitive issues like Winnie-the-Pooh.

  • CCP’s Lesson: The Cultural Revolution showed how rapidly mobilized masses, even under state encouragement, can spiral into factionalism and violence. The CCP fears that open discussions of sensitive topics (e.g., mocking Xi) could spark similar unrest, especially in the digital age, where memes or critiques can go viral.
  • Stability Narrative: The Party frames censorship as preventing “chaos” (luàn), a term often linked to the Cultural Revolution’s anarchy. This justifies suppressing explanations to avoid amplifying controversial content, even if it sacrifices transparency.

Your point that the Cultural Revolution was Mao’s creation strengthens the critique of censorship’s opacity. If the CCP acknowledges the Cultural Revolution as a leadership-driven mistake, it could, in theory, explain censorship decisions (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh) as protecting against destabilizing satire, aligning with your call for transparency. However, the Party’s fear of revisiting historical errors publicly limits this approach, as it risks exposing vulnerabilities.

Let’s refine the analysis:

Why Explanations Are Suppressed

Despite the Criminal Law’s transparency, as you noted, cultural censorship (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh) operates differently:

  • Administrative vs. Legal: Censorship is enforced through vague regulations like the Cybersecurity Law (2017) or Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) directives, not the Criminal Law. This allows flexibility but avoids public debate, as explaining why Winnie-the-Pooh is censored could amplify the memes.
  • Historical Sensitivity: The Cultural Revolution’s legacy makes the CCP wary of any discourse that could be twisted into criticism of current leadership. Xi, often compared to Mao in his centralized power, is particularly sensitive to satire that could draw parallels to Mao’s cult of personality or its fallout.
  • Control Over Narrative: The CCP learned from the Cultural Revolution that uncontrolled ideological campaigns can backfire. Suppressing explanations prevents the public from engaging with sensitive topics, maintaining a tightly controlled narrative.

China’s Counterargument

The CCP would likely argue:

  • Risk of Escalation: Explaining censorship could spark curiosity or dissent, as seen in the Cultural Revolution’s early stages, where Mao’s calls for critique led to chaos. The Party prefers silence to avoid a digital equivalent.
  • Cultural Norms: Respect for leaders is non-negotiable in China’s Confucian framework. Publicly addressing satire risks legitimizing it, unlike the Criminal Law’s clear deterrence of crimes.
  • Efficiency: Censorship is a practical tool to manage 1.4 billion people’s online behavior, avoiding the complexity of educating on every banned item.

Your point about the Cultural Revolution being Mao’s creation highlights a paradox: the CCP acknowledges leadership errors historically but avoids real-time transparency to protect current leaders, fearing it could weaken Xi’s authority.

“Sensitive issues like Winnie-the-Pooh.” For fuck’s sake, this is surreal! If this is a sensitive issue that needs censoring, then what about this article from a state-owned newspaper in Shanghai? China’s EVs Are Smart, Green, and Cheap — Until They Aren’t. Can this not challenge the official narrative that “EVs are green, EVs are the future” and not only in China? Can it not disturb the economy?

So really sensitive issues can be open to public debate, unless it’s about a stupid teddy bear which is such a positive character that it cannot be seen as a mockery! Unless, of course, either Xi personally took offense out of a specific dislike of this bear or his censors are really stupid!

We’ll never find out which is which unless Xi is publicly asked about it while in the West, and he answers. So, yeah, just about never.

🐼

BREAKING NEWS: US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and chief trade negotiator Jamieson Greer will meet China’s “economic tsar” He Lifeng in Switzerland this weekend. He Lifeng, a longtime confidant of Xi Jinping, is vice premier of China and director of the Office of the CCP Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, China’s key macroeconomic planning agency.

Also, Xi Jinping arrived in Moscow. Further coverage.