The last week of December has seen some unfortunate aviation accidents and incidents. Not all were of the same kind, but there were too many either way. And, for the first time, I start to fear flying.

Most people only think of these tragedies

■ Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243 Crash

On December 25, 2024, an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, resulting in 38 fatalities among the 67 people on board. The plane was shot down by Russian fire, with electronic warfare further compromising the aircraft’s control. Apparently, it was mistaken for a Ukrainian drone. Even Putin acknowledged the facts and offered apologies.

■ Jeju Air Flight 7C2216 Crash at Muan Airport, South Korea

On December 29, 2024, Jeju Air Flight 7C2216, a Boeing 737-800 arriving from Bangkok, crashed at Muan International Airport in South Korea. The aircraft skidded off the runway, collided with a concrete fence, and burst into flames, resulting in 179 fatalities out of 181 people on board. Preliminary reports suggest a bird strike and other contributing factors.

I’ll comment a little on the Jeju Air disaster, but first I want to list some less severe incidents.

But there is more

I still want to mention them, especially as the first that follows had an unexpected evolution.

■ SWISS Flight LX1885 Incident

On December 23, 2024, SWISS flight LX1885 from Bucharest to Zurich made an emergency landing in Graz, Austria, due to engine problems and smoke in the cockpit and cabin. All 74 passengers and five crew members were evacuated. One crew member was initially in intensive care but has since passed away.

■ Air Canada Incident in Halifax

On December 28, 2024, an Air Canada Bombardier Q400 experienced a suspected landing gear issue upon arrival at Halifax Stanfield International Airport. The aircraft was unable to reach the terminal, and passengers were transported by bus. No injuries were reported.

■ KLM Flight Diversion in Norway

On December 28, 2024, a KLM flight from Oslo to Amsterdam was diverted to Sandefjord Airport in Norway after a loud noise was heard shortly after takeoff. The aircraft slid off the runway during an emergency landing. No injuries were reported.

■ Small Plane Crash in Stuttgart, Germany

On December 29, 2024, a Cessna C-172 aircraft crashed near the runway while approaching Stuttgart Airport in Germany. The pilot sustained minor injuries, while a passenger was hospitalized with serious injuries. Foggy conditions were present at the time of the accident.

■ Another Jeju Air landing gear problem

On December 30, 2024, Jeju Air Flight 7C101, also a Boeing 737-800, which departed Seoul’s Gimpo International Airport for Jeju island at around 6.37am, returned to Gimpo where it landed safely at 7.25am after a landing gear issue was detected shortly after takeoff.

The SWISS LX1885 case

Most people are usually concerned at the perspective of flying on a Boeing 737 MAX, given the endless issues with such aircraft in the last couple of years: first, with the MCAS, then with the poor manufacturing by Spirit AeroSystems.

But in the case of SWISS flight LX1885, the aircraft was an Airbus A220-300, which is actually a Bombardier CS300 manufactured in the Montréal–Mirabel assembly plant. The A220 program is under the ownership of the Airbus Canada Limited Partnership, now held 75% by Airbus and 25% by the Government of Québec.

What bothered me is that there should have been zero deaths in this incident; a death makes it an accident. From the original communiqué:

SWISS confirms that flight LX1885 from Bucharest to Zurich made an emergency landing at Graz Airport on December 23, 2024 due to engine problems and smoke in the cockpit and cabin. The cockpit crew decided to abort the flight to ensure the safety of the passengers and crew.

There were 74 passengers and five crew members on board the flight. The aircraft landed safely and all passengers were evacuated. Two cabin crew members are currently still in hospital. One cabin crew member had to be flown by helicopter to a hospital in Graz yesterday and is in intensive care; his condition remains unclear.

…

The top priority at the moment is to care for the passengers and crew. SWISS has been on the ground with its own specialists and a care team since last night. The focus is on psychological support and on individual needs, such as onward travel.

All passengers who were hospitalized have since been able to leave the hospital. Currently, two members of the cabin crew are still undergoing medical treatment.

We continue to monitor with concern the condition of the crew member who is in intensive care. Their relatives are on site and are also being looked after by SWISS specialists. SWISS is also in close contact with the doctors treating them. Our thoughts are with the people affected and we sincerely hope that our colleague’s health improves soon. We ask for your understanding that, out of consideration for the relatives, we are not providing any detailed information on the state of health.

…

We are aware that many questions exist regarding this incident and the evacuation of the aircraft. The safety of our passengers and crew is our top priority. SWISS is working closely with the relevant authorities, who are currently investigating the incident. We are doing everything we can to determine the cause of the incident and to support the authorities in their work. We ask for your understanding that we are only able to provide limited information at this time due to the ongoing investigation.

The aircraft involved, an Airbus A220-300 with the registration HB-JCD, has been removed from the runway and Graz Airport has resumed operations. SWISS sincerely apologizes to the passengers for the inconvenience caused and thanks them for their patience and understanding in this difficult situation. Our thoughts are with the affected passengers and crew members, especially those who are still receiving medical treatment. 

On December 30, an update:

We must report, with the deepest of sorrow and regret, that our young colleague died in the hospital in Graz on Monday 30 December. He had been a member of the cabin crew on SWISS flight LX 1885 from Bucharest to Zurich on 23 December, which had to divert to Graz en route after smoke developed in the cockpit and the cabin.

…

We ask you to join us in respecting the privacy of the bereaved at this difficult time. We also ask for your understanding that, out of respect for his family, we will not be providing any further details about the deceased or the cause of death. Thank you in advance for helping us ensure that the family have the time and the privacy to grieve.

Now, this should have been a zero-casualties incident! What happened? I don’t fucking know. But here’s what I learned about the engines of this aircraft.

The better engine that sucks

I have a favorite pilot on YouTube, and I followed him for years, learning a lot about aviation in the process: Petter Hörnfeldt, born in Sweden, living in Spain, Boeing 737-800 pilot and instructor (Mentour Pilot and Mentour Now!). Here’s a playlist: Aviation Accidents explained, by Mentour Pilot.

Other pilots whose YT channels I used to follow: Kelsey Hughes (74 Gear), an American; Joe Diebolder (Captain Joe), a German; Denys Davydov (Pilot Blog), a Ukrainian.

Other aviation-related channels: Mustard; Wendover Productions; Paper Skies, a Ukrainian living in Canada; Aviation Deep Dive; Green Dot Aviation; and Trevor Smith aka Hoover, a former F-15E pilot (Pilot Debrief).

I listed 11 channels; but the two “Mentour” ones belonging to Petter Hörnfeldt are the real deal. I’m sure I’ve watched north of 200 of his videos! The second one is dedicated to shorter videos, which nonetheless remain extremely informative. And now, the shock: THIS Engine Flaw KILLS Airlines!

And not just airlines!

✈️ It was such an engine that powered the Airbus A220-300 (née Bombardier CS300) aircraft involved in the LX1885 incident: test registration C-FOVG, registration HB-JCD, delivered Nov. 2017, configuration CY145, powered by 2x PW1524G geared turbofans.

Now I really feel increasingly anxious at the thought of boarding a plane, any plane!

Just like with software or any kind of IT or communication infrastructure, but really with everything (including the automotive), the ever-increasing complexity made everything increasingly fragile and unreliable. Imagine the Windows 11 level of quality powering everything, from small cars to aircraft—the horror! And, in aviation and in automotive, the complexity is partly because of the race for fuel efficiency and fewer CO2 emissions.

From a certain level of complexity upwards, the fabulous technologies of today can’t be properly mastered, and quality is an unpredictable outcome. So that you know why you’re going to die, should you die because of flying.

BONUS: From the same guy, back in June: Why the Airbus A220 might be DOOMED! Obviously, A220 is a “foreign body” in the Airbus family, as it’s actually a Bombardier CSeries.

The Korean failure

The Juju disaster wasn’t, in my opinion, Boeing’s fault, and not just because the involved aircraft was a Boeing 737-800, not the MAX. There seem to have been several factors that led to the disaster, as it’s often the case in aviation.

For an example, I counted many such factors in the 2000 Concorde crash, if I remember correctly:

  1. The aircraft was near its maximum takeoff weight due to fuel, passengers, and baggage. I thought I knew for a fact that it exceeded the maximum authorized mass due to baggage, but they later said it was still within operational limits.
  2. Takeoff at less than the safe takeoff speed (VR < V2). I thought I knew it was precisely because of the mass, but it seems that the punctured tire was the relevant cause.
  3. The presence of a metal bar detached from a Continental Airlines DC-10 on the runway, due to inadequate runway inspections.
  4. The fact that this bar not only damaged the tires, but the shredded tire debris hit the underside of the left wing, perforating a fuel tank and triggering a fire.
  5. The fact that the flight engineer lost his temper and disregarded the official procedures, shutting down the affected engine when it might have kept running for enough seconds to let the aircraft go beyond the critical ascending phase. I should search for the final report, as they now claim that the crew did shut down the engine “following standard procedures.” I know for a fact that Air France crews are among the most undisciplined ones, so I’m not buying it. (See: The Untold Story of Air France 447; The Strange story of Air France flight 736. And there were many more incidents in which Air France’s pilots indiscipline led to disasters, or narrowly avoided them.)
  6. Some design vulnerabilities of the Concorde (tire sensitivity; unarmored fuel tanks for the sake of saving on weight, despite some limited reinforcements with Kevlar linings after previous incidents).

Back to Juju and to Muan, suspected contributing factors to the Jeju Air Flight 7C2216 disaster include:

  1. Bird intake: initial reports suggested a bird strike as a primary cause, but some experts remain skeptical.
  2. Aircraft’s speed at landing: some experts have noted that the aircraft appeared to be traveling at a higher-than-normal speed during its landing approach.
  3. No landing gear: the aircraft’s landing gear has not been deployed during the landing attempt. The probability of a complete hydraulic failure, even after a bird strike, is extremely low. A pilot error due to stress seems more plausible.
  4. Non-deployment of flaps: observations suggest that the wing flaps, crucial for reducing landing speed and ensuring stability, were not extended. The cause is not obvious, but John Hansman, an aviation expert at MIT, said that the landing gear and wing flaps not being deployed were most likely the result of a problem with the plane’s hydraulics and possibly also its control systems.
  5. No thrust reversers seem to have been applied, even if at least one engine was functional. Confusion in the cockpit? Conscious avoiding of asymmetrical deployment of thrust, even if without any braking support, the runway length would have been insufficient?
  6. Landing point: at first sight, it looked like the aircraft touched the runway towards the half of its 2,800 m runway, or at least some significant distance into it. With no braking support whatsoever…
  7. The presence of a concrete wall about 250 m off the end of the runway. Air safety expert David Learmount said that, had the “obstruction” not been there, the plane “would have come to rest with most — possibly all — those on board still alive”.

Indeed, the end of runways, especially at international airports, should have an Engineered Materials Arrestor System (EMAS) or at least soft and crushable material, such as loose earth or frangible structures, to absorb the impact of overruns while slowing down the aircraft. In the case of Muan (ICAO: RKJB, IATA: MWX), the presence of a concrete navigation structure at the end of the runway is particularly shocking. The mere existence of this concrete structure reflects either negligence or oversight in adhering to global safety standards. In other words: Korea failed!

The same expert:

Learmount pinned the tragedy on a navigation system, known as a localizer, that was placed in the runway’s overrun.

He told Sky News in the UK: “I don’t know what standards they think were appropriate but other airports do not put the instrument landing system antennae in a concrete structure.”

“If that hadn’t been there everybody would be alive now.”

It’s strange that Google Maps doesn’t give a detailed view of the airport, and I couldn’t find any information about the way the unique runway 01/19 has been used. It is my understanding that, following a bird warning from the ATC, the pilot was instructed to land in the opposite direction. Was the initial landing intention for runway 01 and the actual landing on runway 19, or was it the other way around? Did the other end of the 01/19 runway also have a concrete structure? Because if it didn’t, ATC’s advice was yet another contributing factor.

UPDATE 1:

Based on a video in which the aforementioned expert clearly identifies the concrete structure that hosted the ILS on the map of the Muai airport, I can now say this:

  • The aircraft landed on runway 19 (towards the right in these pictures).
  • Should it have landed on runway 01 (towards the left), there would have been no concrete structure, and it wouldn’t have exploded!

UPDATE 2:

Pilot Debrief: What No One Is Saying About Korea’s Deadliest Plane Crash! The title is bombastic, but Trevor Smith aka Hoover had some points to make, which I’ll try to summarize below:

1. Until December 2024, this airport hadn’t hosted regular international flights; Jiju Air flight 2216 was part of a new Muan-Bangkok route launched on December 8. Was the airport operationally ready?

2. The Muan International Airport has the highest bird strike rate of all South Korean airports: 0.09%. There are several bird habitats in the area. At the landing time, about one hour after sunrise, the bird activity would be quite high. Muan didn’t implement any bird-deterring measures, the planned ones (sound cannons, lasers, etc.) being delayed. The local standards require that four people drive away birds from the airport (how?!), but only one was on duty at the time of the crash.

3. Runway end safety area: the ILS equipment installed on very thick, reinforced concrete. Even if it had been at 300 m away from the end of the runway (as required by the standards) instead of 250 m, probably the outcome would have been the same.

However, he also noticed that if runway 01 (to the North) were used instead of runway 19, there wouldn’t have been any obstacles off the end of the runway, apparently.

4. At 8:57, the tower warns the pilots about birds. The recorded data stops at 8:58:50, and at 8:59 the pilot made a Mayday call mentioning “bird strike” and “go around.” The fact that the data recording stopped might suggest an electrical failure that pilots might have had to deal with, beyond the right engine being damaged.

(a) This guy says that the safest option would have been to continue landing, not to go around. But the pilots decided to go around (whoever was the pilot flying, i.e. the captain or the first officer, is not clear).

(b) After going around, the aircraft touches down at 1200 m into the 2800 m runway, so really almost halfway down the runway.

(c) Why the landing gear and the flaps weren’t down, knowing that the 737 has a very redundant hydraulic system? Of course, if the gear had to be extended manually, it wouldn’t have been possible to do it in such a short amount of time. But the thrust reverser was deployed on the right engine, so they did have hydraulic power.

(d) Why was the reverser deployed on the right, defective engine, and not on the left one? Was the right engine actually still providing thrust, while the left one didn’t? Or did the pilots panic and accidentally shut down the wrong engine?

In lieu of a closure

I watched several hundred videos about commercial aviation on YouTube. I never had a true angst about flying, despite the many cases of pilot errors, technical failures, ATC errors, design errors, and other causes of what I call “death by flying because of someone else’s stupidity.”

This time, though, too much is too much. Nothing is safe anymore in commercial aviation. Boeing, Airbus, engines (made by third parties—watch the video!), airport’s designs, incompetent pilots, and everything else. Fuck.

And fuck you, Korea.