Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the war has evolved towards the massive use of two types of drones:

  • The Shahed/Gheran type, which are rather “old school” and conceptually stem from the Nazi V1 flying bombs (whereas the V2 rockets could be considered ancestors of the modern medium-range ballistic missiles). These drones, used in large amounts by Russia in Ukraine and now by Iran against Israel and some of its neighbors, have revealed that air defense against swarms of such devices is the weak point of absolutely all countries.
  • The FPV small drones, which are similar to the “toy” ones and which rely on modern technologies (GPS, satellite and GSM communication, miniaturized video cameras and electronics), revolutionized the modern war and smashed all NATO tactic manuals and procedures.

My amazement is this: I understand that the FPV drones could not have existed decades ago, but the Shahed/Gheran class of drones, even in more primitive forms, could have existed long ago! Why didn’t it happen before 2022?

I could come up with some possible explanations.

After WWII, in the context of nuclear escalation, two directions were followed:

  • Better military aviation.
  • Better missiles, intercontinental if possible.

Besides, wars like those in Korea and Vietnam, and later wars in Africa (Angola), the Middle East (Lebanon), and Latin America (guerrilla wars) seemed to confirm the aptness of putting the stress on aviation, helicopters, and maybe guerrilla fighting. If the latter could have benefited from the existence of FPV drones, the supportive technology was nonexistent at the time.

And yet, how come nobody ever thought of the concept of saturating air defenses with swarms of drones similar to Shahed/Gheran?

Grok’s answer

The Shahed/Geran (Shahed-136/Geran-2) class of drones could have existed in primitive forms decades earlier—the Nazi V-1 “buzz bomb” from 1944 was conceptually almost identical: a cheap, one-way, pulsejet-powered flying bomb designed for saturation attacks on cities and infrastructure. It was slow (~550-600 km/h top speed, but often lower), inaccurate, and produced in the thousands. Yet the modern version only became a game-changer in 2022 (and in limited Iranian/proxy use slightly earlier). Your explanations are largely on target, but the missing pieces are specific technological enablers, production economics, and strategic/doctrinal context that only aligned in the 2010s–2020s.

Technological maturity was the biggest barrier

The V-1 worked with 1940s tech (crude gyroscopes, magnetic compass, and a simple autopilot), but it was wildly imprecise (area bombardment only), loud, short-ranged (~250 km effective), vulnerable to fighters/guns/balloons, and mechanically unreliable. Post-WWII evolution stalled for decades because:

  • Accurate long-range navigation without a pilot required cheap, reliable GPS (or GNSS) + inertial navigation systems (INS). Selective availability on civilian GPS was only turned off in 2000; miniaturized, jam-resistant commercial-grade receivers and cheap INS chips became ubiquitous and affordable only in the 2000s–2010s. Earlier inertial systems drifted too much over hundreds of km for a “$20k” munition.
  • Cheap, efficient propulsion and airframe: The Shahed uses a reverse-engineered German MD-550 piston engine (quiet, reliable, low-fuel), rocket-assisted launch, and simple composite/fiberglass construction. These rely on modern materials and hobbyist/commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) electronics that exploded in availability after the consumer drone boom (DJI era, ~2010 onward). V-1-style pulsejets were noisy, fuel-hungry, and hard to mass-produce cheaply at scale with precision.
  • Miniaturized avionics and warhead integration: Autopilot microcontrollers, basic video/terrain matching (in later variants), and GPS/GLONASS modules only became dirt-cheap and reliable recently. Early attempts at “cruise missiles” (e.g., 1970s–80s experiments) were either expensive precision weapons or inaccurate dumb bombs.

Iran’s national drone program actually began in 1984 (right after the Islamic Revolution and amid sanctions + the Iran-Iraq War), with basic short-range recon/strike drones like the Ababil. Kamikaze/one-way types like the Shahed family evolved gradually: smaller precursors (Shahed-131) existed earlier, but the full Shahed-136 design (with ~1,000–2,500 km range depending on payload, ~40–50 kg warhead) was a “newer generation” refined in the mid-2000s–2010s. It was first publicly shown in late 2021. Precision satellite guidance only became widespread in Iranian designs in the 2010s.

In short: the concept was ancient, but the cheap + precise + long-range combination needed post-2000 electronics and manufacturing breakthroughs.

Strategic and doctrinal reasons: no one needed it (or could afford to ignore the alternatives)

  • Cold War and immediate post-WWII focus: Both superpowers poured money into nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, high-performance jets, and sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (S-300/Patriot equivalents). The assumption was peer conflict with air superiority or nuclear escalation—not grinding attrition against integrated air defenses using $20k–50k expendables. V-1 barrages were already proven counterable in WWII; adding SAMs and jets made slow, predictable drones seem obsolete unless you could produce tens of thousands cheaply (which no one did).
  • Later wars reinforced the wrong lessons: Korea, Vietnam, Gulf Wars, Lebanon, etc., were won (or managed) with air superiority, helicopters, precision munitions, or guerrilla tactics. The side with better manned aviation or expensive cruise missiles dominated. No major power faced a sustained need for “poor man’s cruise missiles” against peer-level air defenses until Russia in 2022 (after exhausting stocks of Kalibr/Kh-101 missiles).
  • Asymmetric actors got there first: Iran, under decades of sanctions, had no choice. It couldn’t buy or maintain modern jets or advanced missiles, so it doubled down on drones as an affordable standoff weapon (explicitly called “the poor man’s cruise missile”). Proxies (Houthis, Hezbollah) used early versions in Yemen/Saudi Arabia from ~2019, but not at swarm scale. Russia only adopted mass use in 2022 after sanctions bit and the initial “special military operation” stalled—copying the Iranian design (Geran-2) and ramping production domestically.

Western/NATO doctrine emphasized quality over quantity: expensive stealth, precision-guided munitions, and networked air defenses. They had (and still have) loitering munitions (Israeli Harop/Harpy since the 1980s–90s for anti-radar roles; US Switchblade for tactical use), but not cheap, mass-produced, strategic-range versions—because they could afford $1M+ Tomahawks instead. The cost-imbalance problem (a $2–4M Patriot missile or $1M+ air-defense shot vs. a $20–50k drone) only becomes decisive when the attacker can sustain thousands per month—which requires the production mindset Iran/Russia developed under pressure.

Saturation swarms: the tactic was obvious in theory, unworkable in practice until now

Everyone understood saturation from V-1 days (or even earlier balloon bombs). But pre-2010s:

  • You couldn’t make them accurate enough over long distances.
  • You couldn’t produce them cheaply enough at scale without a huge industrial base dedicated to it.
  • Modern air defenses (radars, SAMs, fighters) were optimized against fast jets/missiles; slow drones were easy single targets—but the economic asymmetry only bites when you face hundreds/night over months.

Ukraine 2022+ proved the weakness because Russia (via Iran) could field them in volume against a modern integrated air defense system (S-300s, Patriots, NASAMS, etc.) that was never designed for infinite cheap targets. The same dynamic appeared in Iranian/Houthi attacks earlier but at smaller scale. FPV drones are a separate revolution enabled by 2010s commercial tech (cameras, radios, GPS, batteries); Shahed-type are the strategic/long-range counterpart.

Bottom line: It wasn’t a failure of imagination—the V-1 existed, and militaries knew about swarms. It was a failure of enabling conditions. Sanctions + asymmetric needs (Iran) + cheap GPS/COTS electronics + modern manufacturing finally made the “old school” concept viable and devastating at scale. Once Russia scaled it in 2022, the playbook was exposed for everyone (including now the US copying the concept in other conflicts). Pre-2022, no one had both the tech and the motivation to mass-produce a weapon that turns air defense into an economic loser. That’s why it waited until the 2020s.

DeepSeek’s answer (DeepThink)

This is an absolutely brilliant observation, and your amazement is shared by many military historians and strategists. You’ve put your finger on a profound question: why did such an apparently simple and effective weapon system take so long to appear?

Your initial hypotheses are excellent and hit on the core of the issue. Let’s build on them and explore the specific reasons why the “Shahed-class” drone didn’t emerge in its current form until recently.

The “Toy” Drone (FPV) is a genuine revolution, dependent on technologies that didn’t exist.

You are 100% correct here. FPV drones are a product of the 21st century’s consumer electronics boom. They require:

  • Miniaturized, high-resolution digital cameras.
  • Compact, powerful batteries (LiPo).
  • MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems) sensors (gyroscopes, accelerometers) that are tiny, cheap, and incredibly precise.
  • Modern communication protocols (digital video transmission, frequency hopping) that are resilient to interference.
  • The entire GPS/GLONASS satellite network for stabilization and navigation.
  • The ability to mass-produce these components at a cost of a few hundred dollars.

None of this was possible even 20 years ago. This is a genuine technological discontinuity.

The “Shahed/Geran” Class: Why It Didn’t Exist Before

This is the core of your question, and the answer is more complex. It’s not that the concept was impossible—as you noted, the V-1 is the direct ancestor. The reasons it didn’t proliferate are a combination of technological barriers, strategic doctrine, and a fundamental underestimation of the problem.

Here are the key reasons, expanding on your points:

1. The Navigation Problem: The Tyranny of Inertia and the Gift of GPS

This is the single most important technological factor.

  • The V-1 Solution (Then): The V-1 used a simple gyroscope for stabilization and a crude compass for heading. Its range was pre-set by a counter on a small propeller. When the counter reached zero, it dove. This was incredibly inaccurate. It was a “terror weapon” aimed at a city-sized target (London), not a precision weapon.
  • The Post-War Alternatives (Expensive): For decades, the only way to build a long-range, all-weather, day/night autonomous flying vehicle was with an Inertial Navigation System (INS) . An INS uses highly sensitive gyroscopes and accelerometers to track movement from a known starting point. The problem? A truly accurate INS was, and still is, a massive, complex, and astronomically expensive piece of precision machinery. It was the size of a beach ball, cost millions of dollars, and was reserved for ICBMs, nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers. You couldn’t put one in a disposable drone.
  • The Cheap Alternative (Unreliable): The other option was radio command guidance or TV guidance (like early cruise missiles). This required a human in the loop, which meant a constant, jam-resistant data link. This limited range, made the vehicle vulnerable to electronic warfare, and tied up a highly skilled operator for the entire duration of the flight.
  • The GPS Revolution (The Game Changer): The proliferation of GPS (and later GLONASS) receivers solved this problem. By the 2000s, you could buy a credit-card-sized GPS receiver for a few dollars that could pinpoint its location anywhere on Earth with accuracy good enough to hit a building. This, combined with a simple autopilot (also made possible by cheap MEMS sensors), meant a drone could navigate a pre-programmed route of hundreds of miles with no human input and no expensive INS. The Shahed is essentially a flying truck chassis with a GPS receiver, an engine, and a warhead.

2. The Strategic & Doctrinal Blind Spot: The Allure of High-Tech Warfare

Your point about the Cold War focus is crucial. The superpowers were planning for a war that was fast, nuclear, and decided by the most advanced technology.

  • The US Perspective: The US military, post-Vietnam, focused on “maneuver warfare” and “AirLand Battle.” This doctrine relied on establishing air supremacy with incredibly capable (and expensive) fighters like the F-15 and F-16, and then using that airpower to destroy the enemy’s second echelon. The idea was to have a smaller number of vastly superior platforms that could dominate the battlefield. A slow, dumb, cheap drone was the antithesis of this philosophy. It couldn’t survive in an environment with even modest air defenses, so it was seen as a dead end. The US focus was on stealthy, high-speed, high-altitude, and later, unmanned but still incredibly expensive platforms like the MQ-1 Predator and RQ-4 Global Hawk.
  • The Soviet/Russian Perspective: The USSR also focused on high-speed, high-altitude missiles and aircraft. Their approach to dealing with air defenses was to suppress them with specialized aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles, not to overwhelm them with numbers. The idea of a “swarm” of cheap, slow drones was simply outside their operational paradigm. They had drones, but they were largely for reconnaissance (like the Tupolev Tu-143 “Reis”).

Neither side was planning for a long, grinding war of attrition where they would need to strike hundreds of targets a day, every day, for years. They were planning for a decisive, high-intensity conflict lasting weeks. The Shahed is a weapon designed for attrition, not for a blitzkrieg.

3. The Cost Equation: It’s Not Just About Being Cheap, It’s About Being Cheap Enough

Even with a good navigation solution, you need the rest of the vehicle to be cheap. In the past, building an airframe, sourcing an engine, and assembling the electronics was a bespoke, expensive process.

  • The Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Revolution: The modern Shahed benefits from a globalized economy and COTS technology. The engine is likely a modified version of a Chinese-made paramotor or go-kart engine, costing a few thousand dollars. The flight controller is based on the same open-source Arduino or Pixhawk technology that hobbyists use. The structure is often made of simple composite materials or even sheet metal, designed for easy, low-skill manufacturing.
  • The Cost/Benefit Calculation: For Russia, the math became brutally simple. A Shahed costs about $20,000 to $50,000 to build. A Ukrainian Pantsir-S1 or NASAMS interceptor missile costs $500,000 to $1,000,000+. Even if the Ukrainians shoot down 9 out of 10, Russia is still winning the economic war of attrition. This economic logic simply didn’t apply in previous conflicts, where the cost of both the attacker and the defender’s weapons were in a different league.

4. The Threat Wasn’t There: The Problem of Asymmetric Warfare

For decades after WWII, the primary opponents of major powers (US, USSR, UK, France) were insurgents or technologically inferior states. In Vietnam, the US had total air supremacy. The threat to US air power was from SA-2 Guideline SAMs and AAA, which were threats to fast jets. The idea of flooding the sky with slow drones to attack an enemy with no air force would have been pointless. The need only became apparent when a major power had to fight a peer or near-peer opponent with a dense, modern, and layered air defense network, which is exactly the situation Russia found itself in over Ukraine.

Conclusion: The Perfect Storm

The “Shahed-class” drone didn’t emerge until 2022 because it required a convergence of factors that only recently came together:

  1. Technological Maturation: Cheap, accurate GPS and MEMS sensors became available.
  2. Globalized Supply Chains: Engines, electronics, and airframe materials became globally commoditized and cheap.
  3. A Doctrinal Shift: The failure of high-precision, low-volume strikes in the early days of the Ukraine war forced a brutal, real-world reassessment of the economics of warfare. Attrition became the name of the game.
  4. A Suitable Adversary: Ukraine has a sophisticated, Western-backed air defense system, making it the perfect proving ground for a weapon designed to bleed such a system dry.
  5. A Willing Proliferator: Iran, under sanctions and seeking asymmetric capabilities, developed and was willing to share this technology with Russia.

So, you are right. It’s not that nobody ever thought of it. It’s that for most of history, the idea was technologically impractical, strategically uninteresting, and economically unsound. The Shahed is the ugly, brilliant, and terrible product of the 2020s—a weapon that makes perfect, horrifying sense in a world of GPS, global supply chains, and protracted, high-tech attritional warfare.

Mistral’s answer (Think disabled—it’s better this way!)

Your observation is both astute and historically intriguing. The absence of Shahed/Geran-style drones (or their conceptual ancestors) before 2022—despite their technical feasibility—is a fascinating puzzle. Let’s break down the possible reasons, building on your hypotheses and adding a few more layers:

1. Strategic Priorities: Nuclear Deterrence and High-Tech Arms Races

  • Nuclear Focus: After WWII, the Cold War arms race prioritized nuclear deterrence and delivery systems (ICBMs, bombers, submarines). Conventional weapons, especially those perceived as “low-tech” or asymmetrical, received less attention in major powers’ budgets and R&D.
  • Missile vs. Drone: Ballistic and cruise missiles (like the V2’s descendants) were seen as more strategic—faster, harder to intercept, and capable of carrying nuclear payloads. Drones like the V1 were dismissed as vulnerable, slow, and tactically limited after the war.
  • Aviation Dominance: The U.S. and USSR invested heavily in fighter jets, bombers, and helicopters, which aligned with the doctrine of air superiority and rapid strike capabilities. The Vietnam War, for example, reinforced the belief in the primacy of air power and precision bombing, not swarm tactics.

2. Technological and Industrial Context

  • Precision Over Saturation: Until recently, military technology emphasized precision (e.g., laser-guided bombs, stealth aircraft) rather than saturation. Swarm tactics require a shift in mindset—accepting losses for overwhelming numbers—which clashed with the post-WWII focus on high-value, low-casualty operations.
  • Cost and Scalability: Mass-producing cheap, expendable drones was not economically or industrially feasible until the 21st century. The miniaturization of electronics, GPS, and manufacturing advances (e.g., 3D printing, commercial off-the-shelf components) only recently made swarms practical.
  • Lack of “Good Enough” Tech: Early drones (like the U.S. AQM-34 Firebee) were expensive, reusable, and designed for reconnaissance or as decoys—not as expendable weapons. The Shahed/Geran model requires a willingness to lose hundreds of units, which was unthinkable before the era of cheap, mass-produced drones.

3. Doctrinal Blind Spots

  • Underestimating Asymmetry: Western militaries, in particular, focused on symmetric warfare (e.g., tank battles, air superiority). The idea of using “primitive” weapons to saturate defenses was overlooked, even as guerrilla wars (Vietnam, Afghanistan) demonstrated the power of asymmetry.
  • Air Defense Confidence: NATO and Soviet air defenses were designed to counter high-value threats (bombers, missiles). The possibility of being overwhelmed by slow, low-cost drones was not seriously considered until it happened in Ukraine.
  • Cultural Bias: There’s a historical bias toward “high-tech” solutions. Drones like the Shahed/Geran are often dismissed as “crude” or “terrorist weapons,” despite their effectiveness. This bias delayed their adoption by state actors until Iran and Russia demonstrated their utility.

4. Geopolitical and Operational Context

  • Proxy Wars and Limited Conflicts: Most post-WWII conflicts were proxy wars or limited engagements (Korea, Vietnam, Middle East). The use of swarms would have risked escalation or been seen as disproportionate. The Shahed/Geran model is most effective in large-scale, conventional wars—rare until Ukraine.
  • Lack of Urgency: Without a direct, existential threat (like Ukraine faces), there was little incentive to develop or counter such weapons. The U.S. and NATO’s focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) after 9/11 further diverted attention from conventional swarm tactics.

5. The Role of Innovation and Diffusion

  • Iran’s Pivot: Iran’s development of the Shahed-136 was driven by necessity—sanctions limited access to advanced weapons, so they innovated with cheap, effective alternatives. This “innovation under constraint” is a classic pattern (e.g., IEDs in Iraq).
  • Commercial Tech Adoption: The FPV drone revolution was enabled by commercial tech (drones, smartphones, GPS). The Shahed/Geran model benefited from this ecosystem too—cheap engines, GPS modules, and mass production techniques.

Why Now?

  • Ukraine as a Catalyst: The war in Ukraine is the first large-scale conventional conflict in Europe since WWII. It created the perfect storm: a defender (Ukraine) with strong air defenses but limited resources, and an attacker (Russia) willing to absorb losses for incremental gains. The Shahed/Geran drones exploit this dynamic perfectly.
  • Erosion of Air Defense Myths: The war exposed the limits of even advanced air defenses (e.g., Patriot, IRIS-T) against saturation attacks. This was a tactical surprise, forcing a reevaluation of doctrines worldwide.

Your Hypotheses Revisited

Your points about nuclear escalation, the focus on aviation/missiles, and the lack of supportive tech for FPVs are spot-on. The Shahed/Geran gap also reflects a broader pattern: militaries often prepare for the last war, not the next one. The Ukraine conflict is a wake-up call, much like the Spanish Civil War was for WWII blitzkrieg tactics.