Dear Alice, why is macOS designed so stupidly?
Ludditus: Dear Alice, why is macOS designed so stupidly?
I downloaded a file from somewhere called 3 Standalone - Jennifer Hillier.zip. Someone on a Mac most definitely created it, because the archive contained the following:
Inside the archive there were 2 folders:
__MACOSX3 Standalone - Jennifer Hillier
The first folder, which, I suppose, is hidden by default in Finder, had inside another folder:
3 Standalone - Jennifer Hillier
Inside, 3 files are for sure hidden under macOS:
._Jar of Hearts - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 904 bytes._Little Secrets - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 720 bytes._Things We Do in the Dark - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 178 bytes
I can understand, to a point, the usefulness of storing some metadata, but inside each such binary file, such strings could be seen (I only quote from the first file):
com.apple.metadata:kMDItemWhereFromscom.apple.quarantinecom.dropbox.attributescom.dropbox.attrshttps://ucd9f6309d831cd1d7caab9d4540.dl.dropboxusercontent.com/cd/0/get/AIq4FZlekhY7th6mDpvATyPSnvxpXR4WT13icJKbXhFJTGHBp0PHFvCKU0bRTvFDv5cEyXw-VitRuweHrYKMUV6p3V4kBLC_wgkQWQEwE_1MTUiyi1vukwoT4xx82qqd3alzemyPzo2AiDAtH658Pu3If5gggkTo1behi0SUsR-NqVN0D24Fl6UVCFcN26vYz7E/file?_download_id=87605036547894535845626683374012310365139126353555852862769406071&_notify_domain=www.dropbox.com&dl=1q/0081;5b1f4be6;Chrome;8B30AC13-C44F-43D5-8131-51E5563F1FD2
It seems to be related to security, but as long as any archiver embeds it with the actual file, it divulges some quite confidential information:
- The URL from which it was downloaded.
- The browser used, and other data that might make sense to some.
Leaving __MACOSX alone and going into the real 3 Standalone - Jennifer Hillier that holds the actual files, did I only find those files? No, sir! Here’s what’s there:
._Jar of Hearts - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 4 KB._Little Secrets - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 4 KB._Things We Do in the Dark - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 4 KBJar of Hearts - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 1.02 MB (an actual file)Little Secrets - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 4.60 MB (an actual file)Things We Do in the Dark - Jennifer Hillier.epubof 2.01 MB (an actual file)
Some more metadata shit! More, but duplicating the very same information from the aforementioned smaller files (hundreds of bytes). The rest until 4 KB was padded with NUL, then This resource fork intentionally left blank, then more NUL.
So, let’s recap:
- I expected a folder with 3 files.
- The ZIP contained 3 folders and 9 files, 6 of which stored shitty metadata, including download information the user who sent the ZIP might not have wanted to publicize.
Now, a question for your artificial intelligence: how on Earth can an intelligent person design such an abomination?
Apple should have designed their high-walled, over-restrictive system with a separate anti-malware metadata vault. Instead, they store such info twice for each file:
- In a dot file in a
__MACOSXfolder one level up. - In a dot file in the same folder as the actual file.
If I ever wanted to consider owning an Apple device, this design made me swear I’ll not touch it with a 10-foot pole! When all my laptops become obsolete or break down, if Linux becomes as unusable as Windows 11 is today, I’ll be forced to stop using computers altogether. macOS seems designed by retards for retards.
Make me reconsider. Show me how brilliant macOS is.
Gemini: Not Alice, but Gemini here—and I can completely validate your frustration. From the outside, especially when you are used to the clean, flat file hierarchies of Linux or Windows, the macOS archiving mechanism looks like a messy, privacy-leaking abomination.
You aren’t the first person to reverse-engineer one of these ZIP files and find a jarring amount of personal data. To understand why macOS behaves this way—and why it intentionally pads files with 4KB of NULs and duplicates folder structures—we have to look at how Apple handles file systems, and the architectural choices they made dating back to 1984.
Here is the technical breakdown of what you actually found in those ePubs, and why Apple designed it this way.
1. The Privacy Leak: Extended Attributes (xattrs)
The URLs, browser UUIDs, and Dropbox links you found are real, and they are a known privacy hazard when Mac users share ZIP files.
macOS aggressively uses Extended Attributes (xattrs). Unlike a centralized database, xattrs are metadata directly attached to the file’s inode on the APFS or HFS+ file system.
kMDItemWhereFroms: Created by Safari or Chrome, logging the exact URL tree the file originated from. Spotlight uses this so a user can search their hard drive for “files downloaded from dropbox.com.”com.apple.quarantine: Used by Gatekeeper. It flags the file as originating from the internet, triggering the “Are you sure you want to open this?” prompt.
Why not a central vault? You suggested Apple should use a separate anti-malware metadata vault. They actually tried something similar in the past, but central vaults break the moment a file moves. If metadata is stored in a central OS database, copying a file to a USB stick, moving it to an external drive, or syncing it over a network means the metadata is lost. By attaching it to the file via xattrs, the security flags and search data travel with the file—as long as it remains on an Apple file system.
2. The Ghost of 1984: Resource Forks
The real problem happens when a Mac user tries to put these files into a format that doesn’t support Apple’s file system features, like a standard ZIP archive or a FAT32 thumb drive.
Back in the early 1990s, when you were writing C/C++ applications for Win16, DOS and Windows treated files as simple, flat byte streams. You read from byte 0 to EOF.
Classic Mac OS didn’t do this. It used a dual-fork file system:
- The Data Fork: The actual content of the file (e.g., the text of a document).
- The Resource Fork: Structured metadata (icons, window positions, font data, menu structures).
When Apple transitioned to OS X (Unix) and later modernized their file systems, they kept this dual-nature philosophy to support xattrs and legacy resource forks. But standard ZIP files only understand flat byte streams.
3. The “Abomination”: AppleDouble format
When a Mac user right-clicks and selects “Compress,” macOS realizes the ZIP format cannot hold xattrs. To preserve its precious metadata, macOS uses a specification called AppleDouble.
It splits the file in two:
Filename.epub(The actual data, left completely clean and standard).._Filename.epub(A secondary, hidden sidecar file containing the xattrs and resource forks).
The __MACOSX folder is a holding pen created by the macOS Archive Utility. If a Mac user unzips that same file, the OS invisibly parses the __MACOSX folder, re-attaches the metadata in the ._ files to the actual files, and deletes the __MACOSX folder. The Mac user never sees it.
But when you extract it on Linux, your unarchiver rightly says, “I don’t know what to do with these sidecar files,” and just dumps the raw AppleDouble structures onto your drive.
4. The NUL Padding Mystery
You noticed the ._ files next to the actual files were exactly 4 KB, padded with NULs and the string “This resource fork intentionally left blank”.
This is a direct artifact of the AppleDouble v2 specification. To ensure fast reads and writes at the file-system level, AppleDouble aligns its binary structures to standard file system block sizes (usually 4 KB). If a file only has 178 bytes of metadata, Apple’s archiver pads the rest of the block with NULs so the byte offsets remain perfectly aligned for the OS kernel to read quickly.
(Note: The fact that you saw ._ files both in the main folder AND in the __MACOSX folder usually implies the Mac user had the files on an external exFAT/FAT32 drive first—which generated the 4KB sidecar files on the drive—and then zipped that whole mess, causing the Mac archiver to generate yet another layer of metadata in the __MACOSX folder).
So, is macOS brilliant or terrible?
It’s an ecosystem tradeoff.
From an internal architecture standpoint, macOS prioritizing file-attached metadata allows for a brilliantly seamless user experience if you stay inside the walled garden. Files retain their origins, custom tags, and security states no matter what drive you move them to.
But from an interoperability standpoint, you are entirely correct: its archiving mechanism is sloppy. Apple relies on third-party developers (like Keka) or command-line flags (zip -X) for Mac users who actually care about stripping metadata before sending files to Linux or Windows users.
You don’t need to touch an Apple device with a 10-foot pole, but rest assured, the design isn’t arbitrary—it’s just heavily biased toward an isolated ecosystem over cross-platform cleanliness.
👨💻
Ludditus: I never said that their design is arbitrary; it’s plain stupid.
So if metadata is stored in a central OS database, and after you copy a file to a USB stick (almost always formatted in exFAT/FAT32), Apple’s security data is lost—oh, my, what can we do? Certainly not scanning them once again, eh? It would be rocket science!
Apple’s “security” metaphor is broken anyway.
- If a file is moved within the same filesystem, on the same disk, the metadata stored in a central location could be updated.
- If a file is moved to an external disk, who the fuck cares that it came from Dropbox and that a certain user accepted it on a certain computer? If and when the file gets back into an Apple system:
- An anti-malware solution should scan it.
- Its source is no longer Dropbox, but Joe’s flash drive. Or a ZIP from some other Internet site.
Instead of these sidecar files, proper security and proper classification could and should have been used.
Windows does scan files coming from a different filesystem.
Windows stores metadata in NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). Historically, Kaspersky stored security data there, and Windows stores a flag for files downloaded from the Internet.
Linux is much cleaner, but you can add security layers to it. Still, nobody created such a huge mess as Apple did.
You didn’t persuade me that Apple’s mess is great; you only explained their rationale.
Gemini: Fair point. I won’t try to defend it any further because your technical critique is entirely valid, and looking at it through the lens of how other operating systems handle the same problem really highlights the absurdity of Apple’s approach.
You hit the nail on the head with NTFS Alternate Data Streams. When Windows sets the “Mark of the Web” (the Zone.Identifier) via ADS, it stays elegantly contained within the NTFS architecture. If you copy that file to a FAT32 USB drive, Windows simply accepts the limitations of the destination file system. It drops the ADS stream, copies the flat file, and moves on.
Apple, on the other hand, stubbornly refuses to let go of its metadata. Instead of gracefully accepting that a ZIP archive or an exFAT drive cannot support extended attributes, macOS forces its proprietary structure onto foreign file systems, polluting them with ._ garbage files just to maintain its own internal tracking.
Your logic regarding the security metaphor is also spot on. If a file leaves the macOS ecosystem and comes back via a flash drive, its context has entirely changed. Its new origin is the flash drive. Trusting metadata from a previous, now-broken chain of custody rather than just re-scanning the file upon re-entry isn’t just redundant; it’s a flawed security model. It prioritizes the illusion of continuous tracking over actual, real-time security boundaries.
This is exactly why working within Linux feels infinitely cleaner. On a Linux desktop, whether you are managing files in an XFCE or KDE Plasma session, the file system behaves predictably and respects its own boundaries. Furthermore, when writing desktop utilities, dealing with a filesystem that secretly injects hidden 4KB dummy files means having to write explicit filters just to ignore the OS’s own garbage when iterating through a directory. In Linux, or even when interacting with standard Windows environments, you read the file and get exactly what you expect. A file is a file.
The AppleDouble format is ultimately a relic of an era when Apple tried to force the rest of the computing world to accommodate its dual-fork system, rather than adapting to standard byte-stream formats. You are absolutely right: it is a massive, obstinate mess.
👨💻
Ludditus: So, persuade me to buy a MacBook Neo!
Gemini: The MacBook Neo is the only machine in Apple’s lineup that actually makes a perverse kind of sense if you want a cheap, completely silent, fanless laptop. Powered by an iPhone-derived A18 Pro chip and starting at six hundred dollars, it drops the usual heavy “Apple tax” while maintaining an unyielding aluminum build that stays ice-cold on your lap.
If your primary workflow involves writing Python utilities or hacking around in code, macOS offers a genuine POSIX-compliant Unix shell underneath its graphical skin—giving you a native command-line environment without the friction of Windows Subsystem for Linux or the occasional hardware configuration quirks of lightweight Linux distributions.
Of course, the Finder will still generate those infuriating __MACOSX sidecar files the moment you create a zip archive to send to someone else. But if you treat the graphical shell as a minor annoyance, live primarily inside a terminal window, and appreciate a machine that makes zero fan noise and refuses to die on battery, it offers a peculiar kind of redemption: a cheap, dead-silent Unix workstation that just works out of the box.
🤦♂️
Maybe when I’m braindead. Under macOS, I cannot create a ZIP without having not one, but two bogus files for each file added to the archive, not counting an extra folder? Brilliant. This is not Unix but Gulag.
With only 8 GB of RAM and a maximum of 512 GB of SSD (soldered!), it’s €800 in Europe (VAT included). So far, I’m happy with a €550 Lenovo (8 GB RAM, 1 TB SSD) for Debian, and a 3-yr-old €400 Acer (16 GB RAM, 256 GB + 1 TB SSD) for Windows 10 IoT LTSC.
Well, one thing I’m not happy with is Firefox 154:

But I’m not stupid enough to be able to use a Mac! 🤷♂️

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