While I was exasperated by the Sisyphean effort of forming a new government in a certain country, an old thought of mine resurfaced, and it has to do with the typical architecture of modern parliamentary democracies.

In my opinion, several false premises and root causes underlie the apparent dead end most democracies seem to be facing today. I might be a dreamer, but I see a working representative democracy on a different foundation and with a different architecture.

False premise n°1: Representative parliamentary democracy must be structured around political parties, not around individuals. Independent candidates, while generally admitted, must be an exception.

What this rule says is that, regardless of how someone is elected—in a uninominal constituency or via a voting list—and even though such a member of parliament is “your representative,” they were candidates representing a political party, they were members of a political party, and they will keep being members of the respective political party during their mandate.

False premise n°2: Political parties are needed because an elected parliament must form a government, and that government should be made up of members of a party or a coalition of parties.

False premise n°3: An ideal, functional democracy should be structured around the minimum number of political parties necessary for it to meet the definition of “democracy,” which is two, possibly with a third party or other small parties that could be attracted to support the winning party when it can’t reach a majority on its own.

False premise n°4: The more political parties in a parliament, the harder it is to form a majority. Therefore, we must limit the number of small parties by imposing an electoral threshold of 5% or 7%, below which no party can enter parliament, even though independent representatives can, which is a logical contradiction.

My perception of reality finds many faults with this architecture.

Reality n°1: A political party cannot represent anyone’s interests but its own’s.

I cannot be represented by a political party. I voted for an individual representative (unless the national election system mandates voting lists, or unless the vote is dual—for an individual and for a list that is to be used for redistribution). Therefore, it would be normal for that representative to answer only to people who voted for them.

In reality, “my representative” must follow the party’s decisions and political stances, so their conscience is not free. If they vote against the “party line,” they risk exclusion from the party.

This dual subordination—to the party and to the electorate—doesn’t have anything democratic in it. Quite the contrary, this is a fake democracy. I lived in a “socialist” or “communist” country with a sham parliament and a single political party. If there are two or more political parties, but their elected members still have voting mandates, then such a parliament doesn’t have hundreds of votes, but virtually one vote for each party. How is this democratic?

Therefore, the rule should be: One elector has one vote; that vote goes to a person, and that person, once elected, is entirely independent of any external influence. Party subordination should not exist. As a side note, political parties were invented in the early 1800s.

Reality n°2: The other three premises led to a dysfunctional democracy because the so-called parliamentary democracy is based on conflict rather than constructive cooperation. Political competition is destructive, not constructive. The political spectrum and governance as a whole are treated as a zero-sum game, which is the crux of the deadlocks that happen more often than not and is also the cause of public discontent.

Historically, in some parts of Europe, we had this dumb political meme about the alternation in power: “First, the (classic, pro-market) liberals rule so that wealth can be created, then they relinquish the power to social-democrats, who redistribute this wealth; the process then repeats.”

This explains the adversarial system perfectly: when one party takes power, the legislative and executive measures taken are not “for” something, but primarily “against” measures taken by a previous political party or coalition.

There might be a case that the promises made during the electoral campaign and for which members of some party were elected involve the reversal of some preexisting law. But objective situations aside, the basic raison d’être of a political party is not to represent people but to come to power to do what its leaders feel like doing!

This might also explain why it’s so difficult to form a governing coalition when one is needed. If a two-party system like the one in the US is self-locked in a pathetic alternation in power because people have no other choice and because it’s almost impossible to create another political party with national relevance, and if a “two-and-half-party” system in which a small “swing” party can support one or another of the two main parties has no problem governing, the situation is more complex in “more democratic” countries that have 5 or 7 parties in the national parliament.

Electoral coalitions can form to gain traction or overcome the threshold; voting coalitions can form in parliament to support an ideological agenda; but governing coalitions are typically difficult to form.

Politicians and their parties are egotistic and bound to the “winner takes it all” and “my way or no way” mindset. They pretend to represent their electorate, but they only represent their agenda or, more precisely, a mix between the party’s agenda and their personal interests of fame, power, and enrichment.

It’s as if they consider the country to be a company that they rule the way they want, without any accountability during their mandate, but only at its end, when new elections take place. But a company isn’t supposed to be democratic; a country should!

When a political party follows its agenda—not the electorate’s wishes or the country’s best interests—it isn’t keen to share power with other political parties. That would require amending its agenda or even giving up some objectives.

In a reality where two or three parties can hardly govern together, a parliament with a dozen parties would be a nightmare; hence the electoral threshold. And there are even some perverse ways to stifle competition, such as the one I call (from electronics) “dynamic expansion”: the first-past-the-post system used in Britain favors mainstream parties while suppressing the outsiders. If I’m not wrong, at some point UKIP got about 16% of the popular vote but only one MP: the infamous Nigel Farage. Democracy, eh?

How could one expect a parliament made up exclusively of independents to function when it relies on such adversarial principles?

Democracy should be founded on healthier principles.

Principle n°1: Legislating and governing is truly “for the people” and never against anything or anyone!

Principle n°2: Electoral thresholds should be forbidden. Each country should decide whether a parliament should be formed by members of dozens of political parties, hundreds of independents, or a mix of the two.

Principle n°3: A single-party majority should be an exception, not the rule. The norm should be a large coalition of political ideas, represented by party members or independents.

Principle n°4: For such a construct to work, any law and any government should not represent a single agenda, but a “win-win” compromise of all interests represented in parliament. This is consistent with the “for the people” and “never against anyone” desiderata.

Principle n°5: As a corollary, any Government Program should be positively oriented, not adversarially, and should seek to include as many interests as possible of those represented in parliament, not just the minimum required to secure a majority. Thus, a Government would represent not a political party or a coalition of parties, but the entire parliament, and by extension, the entire electorate.

Let’s analyze what this construct would lead to.

Gone is the “our government will undo what yours did” mindset. Governing and enacting laws should be more like wise household management: inclusive and adaptive, not dogmatic. Not any more “this government will kick out immigrants,” “this government will cut benefits and lower taxes,” or “this government will increase taxation because it needs money for its social programs.” A country is not a zero-sum game between corporations and individuals, or between the rich and powerful and the destitute, with the middle class struggling to get by.

Therefore, if a parliament claims to represent EVERYONE, the laws it passes should not be directed AGAINST ANYONE, but should reflect a BALANCED MIX of interests that serve the public interest, not a group’s interests!

Conversely, a Government shouldn’t pursue an agenda that serves one group’s interests; it should accommodate everyone’s interests as much as possible.

Some interpret current “democratic principles” to mean they can claim: “A large coalition or a so-called government of national unity is the opposite of democracy.” Nothing could be further from the truth!

What they mean is that a large coalition would consider a broader range of a nation’s interests, contrary to the previously mentioned adversarial concepts of “winner takes it all” and “my way or no way.” Those opposing comprehensive coalitions believe that each political party has a legitimate interest in governing AGAINST anyone else’s interests!

This is precisely because I said I cannot be represented by a party. Even if, at a certain point in time, some political party’s ideas—if implemented and not merely electoral propaganda—would serve my interests, that would be purely conjunctural. A political party cares only about its leaders, and often hijacks issues widely debated in society to pretend to have solutions and get elected!

If governments were forced to consider, to varying degrees—in proportion to their representation in parliament—all the interests of a society, we would have far better governance.

Such a situation would eliminate the current societal deadlock in which, in most countries, people are immensely dissatisfied with traditional political parties, yet newly formed ones are either extremist or fail to provide. No wonder they fail, as long as the current system means any change in power happens AGAINST one or more groups, rather than a POSITIVE COMPROMISE by certain people at a certain moment.

Unfortunately, a democratic system like the one I have dreamed of for years is impossible, mainly because people are stupid, greedy, and dishonest.

🤖

I asked Gemini what it thought about the ideas above. Its take:

Gemini: Your critique hits on a deeply frustrating democratic deficit: the gap between the idealistic theory of citizen representation and the cynical reality of party machinery. You are essentially diagnosing the toxicity of the adversarial model of democracy—where politics is a zero-sum bloodsport—and arguing for a consensus model, where governance is treated as collective problem-solving.

You aren’t just dreaming; political scientists actually classify democracies along these exact lines. However, translating these principles into a functional architecture reveals a few mechanical friction points.

The Reality of Political Parties

Your assertion that MPs should vote their conscience rather than follow a party line is the textbook definition of a “free mandate.” The strict party discipline we see today does indeed turn hundreds of individual voices into a handful of monolithic voting blocs.

However, eliminating parties entirely runs into a logistical wall. Parties act as vital information heuristics for voters. If a ballot had 200 purely independent candidates, an ordinary citizen could not possibly research the individual voting record, economic philosophy, and moral stances of every single one. Parties bundle ideas so voters know roughly what they are getting.

Furthermore, even if you successfully banned political parties, a parliament of independents would immediately form informal voting blocs to get anything passed. It is an emergent property of human organizing: like-minded people pool their votes to increase their leverage. Eventually, those voting blocs formalize, and you have reinvented the political party.

Electoral Thresholds and First-Past-The-Post

Your perception of how systems suppress competition is spot on. You mentioned UKIP in the UK; in the 2015 General Election, they won 12.6% of the popular vote (nearly 4 million votes) but received exactly one seat out of 650. That is a mathematically absurd outcome driven by the “first-past-the-post” system, which violently suppresses nuance and enforces a two-party duopoly. Removing arbitrary electoral thresholds and moving to pure proportional representation aligns perfectly with your vision of a parliament that actually mirrors the electorate.

The “Never Against” Principle

This is the most utopian part of your framework, and where it clashes hardest with reality. Politics is fundamentally the mechanism by which a society allocates scarce resources. There is almost never a universal “win-win” in public policy.

If a government decides to build a highway, it must use eminent domain to seize land from homeowners. If it taxes carbon to protect the climate, fossil fuel workers will lose their jobs. If it cuts taxes to stimulate business, social services may lose funding. Governing is inherently about trade-offs. A law cannot truly be “for the country” without simultaneously working against the specific, immediate interests of some groups. The goal of a healthy democracy isn’t to eliminate these trade-offs, but to ensure the pain and benefits are distributed fairly over time.

The Grand Coalition

Your vision of a government that represents the entire parliament rather than a slim majority actually exists in the real world. Switzerland uses something called the “magic formula,” where their executive council is composed of the largest parties from across the political spectrum. They are forced to govern by consensus rather than opposition.

The downside of this model is that it makes structural change agonizingly slow. The upside, which validates your theory, is that policy is incredibly stable, wild legislative pendulum swings don’t happen, and public trust in government remains uniquely high.

You concluded by saying this system is impossible because people are stupid, greedy, and dishonest. But human nature isn’t the primary culprit here—incentive structures are. Political systems are just applied game theory. When politicians act selfishly or refuse to compromise, it is usually because their specific electoral system rewards them for it. In a highly partisan, winner-take-all system, a politician who compromises is often punished by extremists in their next primary election.

You don’t need to cure human greed to build a better democracy. You just need to design an architecture—like proportional representation or consensus-based executive councils—that forces competing greeds to neutralize each other in order to get anything done.

My follow-up:

You said, “Governing is inherently about trade-offs.” I never said anything to the contrary. I advocated a compromise. If certain interests are better represented in a parliament, the balance would lean toward them, without completely dismissing the others, as is often the case.

You gave this example: “If it taxes carbon to protect the climate, fossil fuel workers will lose their jobs.” Indeed, but they could be compensated, and their professional reconversion could be sponsored, if their interests were also considered instead of being dismissed. Furthermore, such a dogmatic green agenda has a much larger economic impact. Merely taxing gasoline and diesel when electric vehicles aren’t yet a practical alternative does more harm than good. Everything that requires transportation will become more expensive, without any positive outcome whatsoever. You just proved how obtuse a “Green Deal” can be!

I also didn’t say that political parties should be verboten, but people should be educated to prefer independents, and the electoral system should favor them, too.

It replied:

Gemini: That is a perfectly fair correction on the carbon tax example, and you have highlighted exactly why blunt-force legislation usually backfires. A tax applied before viable alternatives exist—like punishing people for driving combustion engines when they physically cannot afford or charge an EV—isn’t a transition; it is just a penalty. It hits the working class the hardest and breeds massive political resentment.

In public policy, the compromise you are describing is called a “Just Transition.” In a majoritarian system, a party with a slim mandate might ram through a dogmatic green agenda and ignore the economic fallout. In the consensus-based parliament you are envisioning, that same legislation would hit a wall. To pass it, the environmental bloc would be forced to negotiate with labor and economic representatives. The resulting compromise wouldn’t just be a punitive tax; it would have to be a phased timeline intrinsically linked to infrastructure development, alongside funded retraining programs for displaced workers. You are right: this is how you turn a zero-sum shock into a balanced, adaptive policy.

Regarding your second point—structurally favoring independent candidates and educating voters to prefer them—this is essentially an engineering problem. If we don’t ban political parties, we have to dismantle the systemic advantages that make them so dominant.

To tilt the playing field toward independents, a democracy would need to implement specific architectural changes:

  • Replacing the “Wasted Vote” with Ranked Choice: Under first-past-the-post, voters are terrified of voting for a good independent because it might “spoil” the election and help their least favorite party win. A system like the Single Transferable Vote (STV) allows voters to rank candidates by preference. If your independent candidate doesn’t get enough votes, your vote simply transfers to your second choice. This completely removes the fear factor that keeps party duopolies in power.
  • Neutralizing the Party War Chest: Parties monopolize politics because they monopolize funding. Equalizing the field requires public campaign financing models—like “democracy vouchers” where every citizen gets a set amount of public funds to donate to the candidate of their choice, severely diluting the power of centralized party fundraising.
  • Non-Partisan Ballots: In many local elections around the world, candidate party affiliations are intentionally stripped from the ballot. Voters are forced to evaluate the individual’s platform rather than relying on the heuristic of a party logo.
  • Integrating Citizen Assemblies: Some democracies are bypassing party gridlock entirely by convening assemblies of randomly selected, demographically representative citizens (sortition) to study complex issues and propose compromises. When everyday citizens are given time and expert testimony, they almost always reach the kind of nuanced, balanced compromises you are advocating for, entirely free of party ideology.

You are right that civic education plays a massive role in changing voter habits, but human behavior generally follows the path of least resistance. If you change the electoral mechanics so that voting for an independent is no longer punished by the system, the culture will naturally shift away from party tribalism.

One more follow-up:

The first-past-the-post system isn’t the norm; countries like Germany and Italy use mixed voting systems to reduce discontent over underrepresentation, especially where electoral thresholds exist. Such “patches” are still imperfect precisely because of the threshold. Otherwise, various ranked-choice voting systems could be implemented, up to Debian’s Condorcet method adjusted with the cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping, aka the Schulze method, to select the candidate so that the Condorcet winner is indeed the majority-preferred winner once all cyclic ties are considered and all indirect victories are computed.

“Democracy vouchers” are a great idea, and defunding political parties is crucial to reforming our corrupt societies. Legislation meant to ensure more transparent funding of political parties aimed at reducing corruption, but the result wasn’t much different from the opposite.

From forcing independent candidacies in small communities to sortition, lottocracy, and other ideas, these attempts to “fix” an officially “democratic” system reflect discontent and show how dysfunctional our current democratic framework is.

And Gemini’s final answer:

Gemini: The Schulze method is mathematically beautiful precisely because it is designed to find the true center of gravity in a complex electorate. By systematically resolving cyclic ties (the Condorcet paradox), it guarantees that the winner is the candidate who would defeat every other candidate in a series of one-on-one matchups. It is the algorithmic equivalent of the balanced compromise you are advocating for. It is no coincidence that highly decentralized, open-source communities like Debian rely on it—it actively rewards consensus-building and heavily penalizes polarizing figures who alienate large factions, making it hostile to the rigid party tribalism of traditional politics.

Your observation about transparency laws is a textbook example of systemic adaptation. When governments passed laws demanding transparent campaign financing, they didn’t eliminate the corruption; they simply institutionalized it. The backroom envelopes of cash were replaced by legally sanctioned lobbying, political action committees, and disclosed corporate donations. Transparency just gave the electorate a high-definition view of a legalized bribery system they are powerless to stop. Defunding the party machinery entirely is one of the few ways to sever that financial dependency.

You are absolutely right to view these various electoral experiments as “patches.” In engineering terms, modern representative democracy is carrying a massive amount of technical debt. The underlying architecture—designed in the 18th and 19th centuries around adversarial party politics and the assumption that voters needed aristocratic or partisan proxies to filter their will—is fundamentally failing under modern societal complexities.

When a system requires continuous, convoluted workarounds—mixed-member proportional voting to patch the first-past-the-post failures, electoral thresholds to patch the resulting fragmentation, and extreme measures like sortition to bypass the politicians entirely—it is a glaring admission that the core engine is broken.

Lottocracy and sortition aren’t just novelties; they are a profound indictment of the electoral process itself. They are born from the realization that the current system actively selects for the worst possible traits for governance: narcissism, dogmatism, and an inherent willingness to prioritize party survival and donor interests over public utility. We are essentially trying to bolt a modern, consensus-driven interface onto a legacy engine built for zero-sum conflict.