Post-Shenzhen wisdom about China
Gabriel Florin Șerban, born in Sibiu but living in Hannover, self-declared political anthropologist and “founder of politomorphism” on FB, and much more on LinkedIn, just posted in Romanian an opinionated analysis of “China vs. the world” in the wake of the trilateral meeting in Shenzhen.
I thought it useful to translate it in English, alongside three of his answers to readers’ comments, as food for thought. The translation was performed by Gemini Neon, and I can certify that it preserves the original meaning. Have fun!
❶ Gabriel Șerban: I’m looking at the taxi stand in Hanover and I can’t believe my eyes. The war is over, and we didn’t even notice it had started.
For years, all you saw at taxi stands were Mercedeses, and for the past few years Teslas too—the car of the “future.” Now I look around and I keep seeing three letters nobody had even heard of five years ago: BYD.
It’s not just my impression. On July 21, 2026, the Chinese automaker launched a nationwide push targeting German taxi and rental companies, right after Mercedes discontinued its factory-built taxis.
The trade press is talking about 37% discounts on the top-trim Seal 6 DM-i Touring hybrid station wagon. And the big numbers tell the same story: from January through August, BYD sold 177,752 cars in the EU—up 163%—while Tesla sold 142,165.
Who’s behind them? Wang Chuanfu, a poor kid from Anhui province, orphaned young, who started out in Shenzhen in 1995 making cell phone batteries. And his right-hand woman, someone Elon Musk would do well to fear: Stella Li.
Executive Vice President of BYD and CEO for the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, she joined the company in 1996. Now she has announced that BYD’s European network will surpass 2,000 locations by the end of 2026, and in Germany the number of sales and service centers will nearly triple. She is Musk’s worst nightmare.
Why is Musk losing? Because he forgot the anthropology of the buyer: an ordinary person doesn’t want a rocket with Autopilot that steers you into a guardrail. They want an affordable car that gets them to work, to the grocery store, and back without having to sell a kidney for routine maintenance.
BYD gave them exactly that: a good, affordable car, without the arrogance. Musk gave them a rusty Cybertruck and the promise that the robotaxi is coming “next year”—for eight years running.
To understand what’s happening, you have to go back 2,200 years.
In 1974, some farmers digging a well near Xi’an stumbled upon something nobody expected: an entire army of terracotta soldiers—more than 8,000 of them, each with a different face—along with chariots, horses, and weapons. They were guarding Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor, who unified China in 221 BC.
Now here’s the part that matters. Qin didn’t just conquer territory; he standardized everything: writing, currency, weights and measures, and even the axle width of chariots so they could all travel on the same roads.
The clay soldiers themselves were mass-produced from modular parts. Mass production, 2,000 years before Henry Ford. When you look at a BYD factory today, you see the exact same idea: scale, standardization, total control.
The Han dynasty opened the Silk Road. Under the Song, China already had paper, the compass, gunpowder, printing, and paper money centuries before Europe. Around 1405, Admiral Zheng He’s fleets during the Ming dynasty had ships that would have made Columbus’s look like fishing boats.
Then China closed itself off, and the West pulled ahead. What followed is what the Chinese call the “century of humiliation”: the Opium Wars, foreign powers carving up their ports, the fall of the last emperor in 1912, civil wars.
And they haven’t forgotten. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping opened up the country, and in 1980 Shenzhen—a fishing village—became a special economic zone. Today it’s a megalopolis, BYD’s headquarters, and the city where yesterday Xi Jinping hosted Trump and Putin at the same table.
That wasn’t a coincidence: that was the showcase.
2,500 years ago, in The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote that the supreme art of war is to break the enemy’s resistance without fighting—to win before the battle even begins. That is exactly what happened. China didn’t come at us with tanks. It came with prices.
While Europe debated, they bought lithium mines, built battery factories, and locked down the processing of rare earths. When the EU slapped tariffs on Chinese EVs, BYD sent over hybrids, which aren’t subject to the same tariffs, and started building factories right inside Europe.
You don’t charge the wall; you go around the fortress. Sun Tzu, chapter one.
Because we play chess on a four-year clock, the length of a political term, while they play Go on a fifty-year horizon.
Because BYD makes its own batteries, its own chips, and even the ships that transport its cars, while we rely on ten suppliers across three continents.
Because a cab driver in Hanover doesn’t buy ideology—he buys the car that costs him the least per kilometer. And right now, that car is Chinese.The fight isn’t lost because they’re innately better. It’s lost because they had a plan, and we had meetings.
The clay army sat underground for 2,200 years and waited. Europe doesn’t have that kind of time left.
Yesterday we watched Sun Tzu’s lesson play out live, in front of cameras from around the world.
At the Kylin Villa in Shenzhen, the leaders of America, China, and Russia sat down at the same table for the first time in history. Everyone watched what got signed. I watched who was holding the door.
Shenzhen. 90 minutes. Zero paperwork. And a lesson in anthropology you don’t forget.
The grand Trump–Xi–Putin summit is over. The first three-way meeting in history.
What got signed? Next to nothing.
Four broad bullet points: UN reform, nuclear talks with no date and no venue, more refined oil, and a swipe at the International Criminal Court.
Ukraine? Nowhere to be seen. Iran? Nowhere to be seen. Gaza, Sudan, Taiwan? Nothing.
Trump left for America without speaking to reporters. Then he gave himself a 12 on a scale of 0 to 10.The real message wasn’t on paper. It was in the protocol. And the Chinese are masters at it.
- Xi met Trump personally at the bottom of the airplane stairs.
- For Putin, he sent Cai Qi, fifth in the hierarchy. Basically a doorman with a title.
- When Trump walked in, they played the American national anthem.
- When Putin walked in, they played an excerpt from The Nutcracker.
Translation: America is received as a state; Russia as a ballet.- For the group photo, Xi and Trump stood shoulder to shoulder. They shook Putin’s hand and gestured for him to step off to the side. Like at a wedding when they tell you: sure, you’re with the bride’s family, just over at the table next to the restroom.
Who won?
- Putin asked for the meeting. He got the photo op, a paragraph criticizing the court that issued a warrant for his arrest, and an invite to the G20 in Miami. He came to negotiate his war, and his war doesn’t even get a single line. He got the picture, but he left owing Beijing.
- Trump got his headline and a nuclear dialogue with no timeline. Waiting for him back home are a lost Congress and a Pew poll showing 67% disapprove of his handling of the war in Ukraine.
- And Xi won without firing a shot. Host, center of the frame, arbiter.
The very next day, his foreign minister spoke of a “new paradigm” and announced expert-level coordination. That’s no longer a photo op. That’s the beginning of an institution. The rule still holds: if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.
Tesla buys batteries. BYD MAKES them. Whoever controls the battery controls the price. Whoever controls the price controls the street. In five years, the question won’t be “Do you have a Tesla or not?” It will be “How many BYDs did you see at the stoplight today?”
Musk won the battle for attention. The Chinese won the war for production. And history doesn’t remember who got the most likes. It remembers who put the world on wheels.
And Europe? Wasn’t even in the room. Ukraine, even less so.
Which brings us to the real lesson of Shenzhen.
Why did Xi win without raising his voice, without giving himself a 12 out of 10, without calling his allies “friends”?
- Because Americans think in four-year terms. Russians think in terms for life. The Chinese think in dynasties.
- Trump wanted a photo before the evening news. Putin wanted a photo to outrun an arrest warrant. Xi wanted a paradigm. He got it.
You don’t mess with the Chinese because they aren’t in a hurry to win the round. They wait to win the match.
They have 4,000 years of statehood behind them. They’ve seen Mongols, Manchus, Brits, Japanese, Americans.
All of them came; all of them left. China stayed. Not because it’s stronger, but because it’s more patient.
- An American hands you a hamburger and demands loyalty on the spot.
- A Russian hands you a bottle of vodka and demands your territory the next morning.
- A Chinese host pours you tea, smiles, gets you to thank him for his hospitality in the official communiqué, and ten years later you realize the port, the battery plant, and the 5G network all belong to him.
That’s exactly what he did in Shenzhen.
He didn’t humiliate Putin. He soothed him with culture. He played The Nutcracker instead of the anthem. Meaning: I respect you as a civilization, but I no longer treat you as an equal state. Stand off to the side for the photo. Thank me for the tea. And next time you’re selling oil, you’re still coming to me.
He didn’t confront Trump. He lavished him with honors. Met him at the plane stairs, played his anthem, put him front and center. Meaning: you’re big, you’re important, you’re my guest. Only you’re playing on my stage, in my city, by my rules. And at the end of the day, you’re still thanking me.
That is a 4,000-year-old art: you don’t defeat your adversary. You make him your guest. And a guest doesn’t slam his fist on his host’s table. Unless he’s a moron.
Back in 2000 BC, on this land there was no Romania, no Dacia, not even Burebista in the dreams of history. There were the Cucuteni, Gumelnița, and Hamangia cultures. People who painted pottery with the painstaking patience of the Chinese, who ritually burned down their villages every 70 years and started over. They didn’t have a state. They had clay, fire, and patience. As an organized people, we have—generously speaking—1,600 years since the Dacians, and 160 years as a modern state.
The Chinese had bureaucracy, imperial exams, and maps while we were still squabbling between hamlets. That’s where the difference in tempo comes from. And that’s where the lesson should come from, too.
A Chinese craftsman is capable of spending 20 years on a single jade carving. A master in Suzhou takes a raw stone, sets it on his table, and for an entire year does nothing but look at it. He turns it over in the morning, turns it over in the evening, studies its veins, its fissures, how the light hits it. He doesn’t put a chisel to it. He learns it. After a year, he begins to carve. Ten years. Every day, the same stone, the same hand, the same breath. Then another five years polishing it. Not with a machine—by hand, with fine paste, until the jade turns into frozen water. He knows the stone isn’t in a rush, so neither is he. When he’s done, that piece lives for 1,000 years.
And I know exactly what I’m talking about, because it takes me a year to write a book. A year to gather information, read, fact-check, piece documents together, sit with them on my desk the way the Chinese master sits with the jade. You can’t write a serious book in two weeks, any more than you can carve jade with a power drill. If after ten pages you say, “Oh god, this isn’t working, it’s no good, nobody’s going to read this,” and you rip it all up and start cursing, yelling, blaming the country, Facebook, the algorithm—then you haven’t written a book, you’ve had a meltdown. What would happen if I threw away my book after ten pages?
The exact same thing that happens to Romania every six months: we start over from scratch, with a new government, a new plan, a new reform. And then we wonder why we never finish anything.
Look at them. I see them on the street here in Europe, too. They smile, they’re calm, they don’t yell, they don’t scream. They don’t lay on the horn hysterically. They wait patiently in line. They speak softly. Not because they don’t have nerves, but because they run on a different internal clock. They don’t live by the seconds of a traffic light; they live by the timescale of stone.
A Romanian—if you haven’t moved within three seconds of the light turning green—practically breaks the steering wheel hammering the horn. He wants the highway finished yesterday, justice today, a pension tomorrow, and a revolution between two commercial breaks. If the country hasn’t transformed in six months, he says it’s hopeless and leaves. Or worse, he stays and keeps honking.
Our problem [in Romania] isn’t stupidity. Our problem is a short time horizon. We want everything fast because we’ve always lived with the feeling that our time is being stolen from us—by the Turks, the Russians, the communists, the post-communist transition, the PSD [Romanian political party], the EU, by life itself.
So we learned to rush. To jump the gun. To run red lights.
The Chinese learned the opposite: time belongs to them. Why hurry when you’re the empire that remains?
It’s time for us to learn that lesson too—at least part of it.
Lidia Bradley: I have just one critique of your excellent article: China is a dictatorship, even if an enlightened one. One could draw the conclusion that their results are only possible because of that—and wouldn’t be possible in a democracy with meetings and free elections. I’m referring to Europe and the U.S., not our own particular disaster.
❷ Gabriel Șerban: Thank you for the nuance—it’s a fair point. But I wasn’t talking about political ideologies, though I think I could carry that conversation too.
I wasn’t praising dictatorship. I was describing a technology of time.
China’s political model today is no longer Maoism, nor even classic communism. It’s a hybrid that political scientists call a single-party bureaucratic meritocracy: at the base, exams, results-based promotions from local town halls all the way to Beijing, mandatory rotation of officials, performance reviews based on hard numbers—how many kilometers of rail built, how much GDP growth, how many people lifted out of poverty. At the top, yes, an authoritarian center that doesn’t face voters. I call it efficiency without turnover.
The results don’t come from dictatorship itself. Dictatorships are a dime a dozen and mostly produce misery—just look at Putin’s Russia or North Korea. China’s results come from three things that don’t require a dictatorship to work:
- Administrative continuity. A Chinese mayor knows his ten-year plan won’t be scrapped by the next mayor the way it is here. Here, every new minister starts off by undoing their predecessor’s work.
- Evaluation based on competence, not cronyism. To become a governor, you’ve spent 20 years working your way up through public office. Here, you become a cabinet minister because you put up campaign posters.
- Institutional patience. They can afford to think in decades because nobody is demanding results in time for the 5 o’clock news. That is NOT the exclusive domain of dictatorship. De Gaulle’s France did it, Adenauer’s Germany did it, and Roosevelt’s America did it.
Democracies with meetings and free elections can do the exact same thing if they want to. Switzerland spends 17 years building a tunnel and no political party shuts it down. Norway puts its oil revenues into a sovereign wealth fund for its grandchildren. The problem in Europe and the U.S. isn’t democracy. It’s democracy turned into a four-year electoral talk show, where nobody plants trees anymore because they won’t be sitting in their shade by the next election.
I’m not suggesting we copy the regime. I’m suggesting we copy the patience. Carving jade doesn’t require a single-party state. It just requires us to stop smashing the stone after ten pages.
Adriana Vasile: Speaking of what Lidia Bradley wrote—when low prices and efficiency rely on fear and exploitation, with prisoners, whether political or from marginalized communities like the Uyghurs, working for free, and a quasi-communist oligarchy grows more powerful by the day, even in a dictatorship like China—aren’t cracks forming in this supposedly millennial structure? And isn’t the war we’re currently caught up in, directly or indirectly, being used by China to reclaim Siberia and toss it to the masses like a bone to chew on in a society where tensions are managed through suppression and repression?
❸ Gabriel Șerban: Let’s take these one by one, because they’re three different things:
1. Low prices and fear
In the case of Xinjiang and the Uyghurs, there are documented reports from the UN, NGOs, and investigative journalists detailing forced labor, labor transfers, and mass surveillance. Beijing denies it and talks about “vocational training programs.” We don’t need to adjudicate the case like a courtroom to understand the anthropological mechanism: when you drive labor costs to zero through coercion, you gain short-term competitiveness, but you lose long-term trust—sanctions, EU countervailing duties, broken supply chains. That’s exactly what we’re seeing now with the EU’s investigations into electric vehicles.2. Cracks in a seemingly millennial structure
Yes, they’re appearing. They just aren’t classic Soviet-style cracks with protests in the public square. They’re a different kind of fracture:
- Demographic: rapid aging, a shrinking population;
- Economic: local government debt, a real estate crisis, youth unemployment;
- Trust: private entrepreneurs are holding back on investment because they never know when the Party will step in;
- Ethnic and regional: Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong are held together by control, not consent.
The Chinese system doesn’t resolve tensions; it suppresses and defers them. That works for as long as economic delivery compensates for the lack of freedom. When delivery slows down, suppression has to ramp up. It’s a cycle that gets more expensive all the time.
3. Our war and Siberia
Here I’d be more cautious than you’re suggesting. The idea that China is using the war in Ukraine to seize Siberia and “toss it to the masses like a bone to chew on” is a seductive hypothesis, but the data doesn’t back it up for now. What China is actually doing right now:
- buying Russian oil, gas, and coal at steep discounts;
- selling Russia cars, electronics, and machinery, bypassing sanctions;
- securing agricultural and forestry concessions in the Russian Far East;
- building Moscow’s dependence on Beijing, not the other way around.
It’s a quiet economic takeover of Siberia, not a military annexation. Beijing doesn’t need to send tanks to control an empty, poor region that depends on its money. All it has to do is wait. And a military adventure would cost China the one thing it can’t afford to lose right now: access to the EU and U.S. markets.
In short: your instincts on the diagnosis are spot on—an efficient dictatorship churns out its own vulnerabilities—but on the prognosis, I’d shift the emphasis from “it will take Siberia with an army” to “it’s already taking Siberia with contracts.”
George Enescu: BYD = a company controlled and subsidized by the Chinese state. Let’s drop the tear-jerker rags-to-riches tales about the dishwasher who became a millionaire.
❹ Gabriel Șerban: False. BYD is a private company publicly traded on the Hong Kong and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Founder Wang Chuanfu owns ~17.8% and is chairman; Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway put $225 million into it in 2008 for a 10% stake—I don’t think Buffett invests in a “state-owned company.” The Chinese state doesn’t hold a majority stake; it has regulatory levers like ANY state, including Germany with Volkswagen. Wang wasn’t a dishwasher—he was an orphan from Anhui, a chemist, who worked at a battery research institute in Beijing. In 1995, in Shenzhen, with 2.5 million yuan borrowed from a cousin, he started a cell phone battery factory. In 2003, he bought a bankrupt automaker, and everyone laughed. Buffett didn’t laugh—he bought in. That’s not a tear-jerker legend; that’s a stock exchange filing. While you’re typing this, BYD sold 177,752 cars in the EU from January to August 2026 (+163%), compared to Tesla’s 142,165. Those aren’t legends; those are vehicle registrations.
So drop the “state-controlled” line. The only thing being controlled here is your keyboard—by frustration. And the only subsidy you’re getting is my free attention. Every now and then someone pops up who couldn’t even find Shenzhen on a map. “Hey, let me dash off a comment at a red light before I lay on the horn at the guy in front of me after two seconds. Maybe it’ll really get under his skin.”

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